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XXVI] Important topics of the Brahma-sūtras 143 (āropa) is unacceptable, since no one thinks the conch-shell to be identical with its illusory imposed silver. There are no grounds for holding that knowledge of the basis should necessarily involve knowledge of the imposed, and so the former cannot be considered as the essence of the latter; and the knowledge of earth does not remove the knowledge of jug, etc., nor does knowledge of earth imply knowledge of its form as jug? Jaya-tīrtha in his Nyāya-sudhā on this topic formulates the causal doctrine of the Madhva school as being bhedābheda theory, which means that effect is in some ways identical with cause and in other ways different. Thus it opposes both the extremes—the complete difference of cause and effect as in Nyāya, and their complete identity as in Sankara or the Sāmkhya. He argues that, if the effect were already existing identical with the cause, then that also would be existent previously in its cause, and so on till the original root cause is reached. Now, since the root cause is never produced or destroyed, there could be
ruction of ordinary things, such as cloth, jug, etc., and there could be no difference between eternal entities, such as soul, etc., and non-eternal entities, such as jug, etc., and causal operations also would be useless. Moreover, if the effect (e.g., cloth) is previously existent in the cause (e.g., threads), it ought to be perceptible; if the existence of anything which is in no way perceptible has to be accepted, then even the existence of a hare's horn has to be admitted. If the effect (e.g., cloth) were already existent, then it could not be produced now; the effect, again, is largely different from the cause; for, even when the effect is destroyed, the cause remains; the causes are many, the effect is one; and the utility, appearance, etc., of them both also widely vary. It is urged sometimes that production of the effect means its manifestation (vyakti) and its destruction means cessation of manifestation (avyakti). This manifestation and non-manifestation would then mean perception (upalabdhi) and non-perception (anupalabdhi). That would mean that whatever is perceived at a particular time is produced at that time. If the effect were previously existent, why was it not perceived at that time? In case everything must exist, if it is to appear as produced, then it may be asked whether the manifestation (abhivyakti) was also existent before the appearance
I mrt-tattua-jñāne'pi tat-samsthāna-višeşatva-rupa-ghatatvā-jñānena ghatas tattuato na jñāta iti vyavahārāt. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 879.
