________________
XXIV] Brahman, Paramātman, Bhagavat, Paramesvara 23
devotees. The world is produced by the māyā power of God and is therefore not identical with Him. The gross and the impure selves and the world, all that is conscious and unconscious, the cause and the subtle pure element of the self-none of them are different from God, because the subtler ones are of the nature of His power, and the grosser ones are the modification or effects of His power; and though the world is one with Him, yet the defects and impurities of the world do not affect Him in the least, for in spite of these transformations He is untouched by them; such is the supra-logical character of His power1.
Jiva then proceeds to show that the ultimate substance of the gross physical world, of the five elements and their modifications, is none other than the highest self, Paramātman or God. There is nothing in gross physical objects which can explain their appearance of unity as concrete wholes. For these wholes cannot be wholes in the same sense as forests made up of trees; these latter, indeed, cannot properly be called wholes, for, if one pulls a tree, the forest is not pulled; whereas in the case of a concrete object, when one pulls at one end, the object itself is pulled. If it is argued that there is a whole distinct from the parts, then its relation to the latter would be incomprehensible, for it is never experienced as entirely different from the parts; if the whole is supposed to be connected with each of the parts, then even a finger may be felt as a whole body; if it is supposed that a whole exists in parts only, in parts, then the same difficulty will again arise, and there will be a vicious infinite. So no concrete whole as distinct from the parts can be admitted to exist, and for the same reason the separate concrete existence of the elements may be denied. If the existence of wholes is denied in this way, then the existence of parts must also be denied; for, if there are no wholes, then there cannot be any parts, since it is only the wholes that are directly experienced, and parts are only admitted to account for the experience of the wholes. So the only assumption that remains is that God is the ultimate substance. Jiva refers to the Bhāgavata-purāṇa, III. 6. 1-3, which seems to hold that the discrete elements of God's own powers form the twentythree Samkhya categories, which are combined and united into wholes through the element of time, which is but another name for His transcendent effort. The curious doctrine here put forth is 1 Ibid. p. 251.
