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106 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras [CH. be an object of the Vedānta to instruct about its nature. For, if the illusory non-appearing remains even when the self is known, this illusion can never break; for all illusory images break with the true knowledge of the locus or the support (adhisthāna) of such illusions (e.g. with the knowledge of the conch-shell the illusory image of silver vanishes)". Moreover, the ātman is self-revealed, and so it cannot be said that it does not appear in experience as self-revealed (svaprakāšatvena bhāvayogāt). If it is argued that, though selfrevealed, yet it may be covered by avidyā, the answer to such an objection is that, if the avidyā could cover the revelation of the self, the avidyā itself and its products such as pain, sorrow, etc., could not be revealed by it; for it is acknowledged that the revelation of these is effected by the self-revealing self?. It is also evident that intelligence (cit) or the being self-revealed (sphurati) cannot also remain not-revealed (asphurati). Nor can it be held that, though pure intelligence is itself in its purity self-revealed (sva-prakāša), yet, since it is opposed to ajñāna only through the mental states (vrtti) and not by itself, and since ordinarily there is no ortti for itself, it can lie covered by the ajñāna and, being thus hidden in spite of its self-revealing character, can become a fit subject of enquiry. Such a supposition is not true; for, if the pure intelligence is not opposed to nescience (ajñāna), the sorrow, etc. which are directly known by pure intelligence should have remained covered by ajñāna. The view is that pleasure, pain, etc. cannot be considered to have a reality even while they are not perceived. A mental state or vrtti of the form of an object is only possible when the object is already existent; for according to Vedānta epistemology the antahkarana or mind must rush out through the senses and get itself transformed into the form of the object, and for this the object must exist previously; but feelings such as pleasure, pain, etc., have no existence except when they are felt; and, if it is said that a vrtti is necessary to apprehend it, then it must be admitted to have a previous objective existence, which is impossible. It must be admitted, therefore, that feelings are directly known by
adhişthāna-jñānasyaiva bhrama-virodhitayā tasmin saty api bheda-bhramasya tan-nimittakāgrhītāropasya vă abhyupagame nirvartakäntarasyābhāvāt tadanivstti-prasargāt. yad uktam abhāsamano'mša ātmātiriktaś cet satyo mithyā vā iti tatra mithya-bhūta iti brūmah. Candrikā-vākyartha-vivrti, p. 18.
2 sva-prakāśasyāpi avidyā-vaśād abhāne avidyāder duhkhādeś ca prakāšo na syāt, tasya caitanyaprakāśādhanaprakāśāc copagamāt. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 19.
3 sukhăder jñātaikasattvābhāvāpātāt. Op. cit. p. 20.
