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112 Madhva's Interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras (ch. way, as not being limited by difference, but as being fullness in time, space and qualities; for otherwise even the Buddhist momentary knowledge would have to be considered as equal to Brahman, since it is limited neither by time nor by space!
Coming to the formation of the compound Brahma-enquiry (brahma-jijñāsā), the Candrikā points out that neither Sankara nor his followers are justified in explaining Brahman as being in the objective case with reference to the verb implied in "enquiry" (jijñāsā); for Brahma--being pure and absolute intelligence, open only to direct intuition cannot be the fit object of any enquiry which involves discussions and arguments?. But, of course, in the Madhva view there cannot be any objection to Brahma being taken as the object of enquiry. According to both the Nyāya-sudhā and the Tātparya-candrikā the word "enquiry" (jijñāsā) in Brahmaenquiry (brahma-jijñāsā) means directly (rūdhi) argumentative reasoning (manana) and not desire to know, as the followers of Sankara would suggest 3. The object of Brahma-enquiry involving reasoned discussions is the determination of the nature of Brahman, whether He possesses the full perception of all qualities, or has only some qualities, or whether He has no qualities at all4.
Not only did the followers of Madhva try to refute almost all the points of the interpretation of this sūtra by Sankara and his followers, but Madhva in his Anuvyākhyāna, as interpreted in the Nyāya-sudhā and Nyāya-sudhā-parimala, raised many other important points for consideration, which seem to strike the position of Sankara at its very root. A detailed enumeration of these discussions cannot be given within the scope of a single chapter like the present; and I can refer to some only of the important points. Thus the very possibility of illusion, as described by Sankara, is challenged by Jaya-tīrtha, following the Anuvyākhyāna.
1 bauddhābhimata-kșanika-vijñānāder api vastutah kālādy abhāvena aparicchinnatva-prasangāc ca; tasmād deśataḥ kālataś caiva gunataś cāpi pūrnatā brahmatā, na tu bhedasya rāhityam brahmatesyate. Tātparya-tīkā, p. 94.
para-pakşe vicāra-janya-jñāna-karmano brahmaṇo vicāra-karmatvāyogāt, aparokşa-ustti-vyāpyasya phala-vyāpyatva-niyamāc ca. Ibid. p. 95.
3 The Bhāmati, however, holds that the primary meaning of the word jijñāsā is “desire to know"; but, since desire to know can only be with reference to an object which is not definitely known (jñātum icchā hi sandigdha-visaye nirnayāya bhavati), it means by implication reasoned discussion (vicāra), which is necessary for coming to any decided conclusion.
tasmād vedāntādinā pāta-pratite brahmani saguņa-nirgunālpagunatvādinā vipratipatter jijñāsyatvam. Tātparya-candrikā, p. 109.
