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Interpretation of Brahma-sutra 1.1.1
115
proved, and that a differenceless entity may be the proof cannot be established by the differenceless entity itself; for this would involve a vicious circle. If the world were false, then all proofs whereby this could be established would also by the same statement be false; and how then could the statement itself be proved?
As has just been said, the opponents, since they also enter into discussions, must admit the validity of the means of proof (pramāṇa or vyavahṛti); for without these there cannot be any discussion (katha); and, if the proofs are admitted as valid, then what is proved by them as valid (prameya or vyāvahārika) is also valid1. In this connection Jaya-tirtha raises the points contained in the preliminary part of the Khandana-khanda-khadya of Śrīharṣa, where he says that it is, of course, true that no discussions are preceded by an open non-acceptance of the reality of logical proofs, but neither is it necessary to accept the validity of any proof before beginning any discussion. Those who begin any discussion do so without any previous forethought on the subject; they simply do not pay any attention to the ultimate existence or non-existence of all proofs, but simply begin a discussion as if such a question did not need any enquiry at the time2. In a discussion what is necessary is the temporary agreement (samaya-bandha) or the acceptance for the purpose of the discussion of certain canons of argument and proofs; for that alone is sufficient for it. It is not necessary in these cases that one should go into the very nature of the validity or invalidity, existence or non-existence of the proofs themselves3. So even without accepting the ultimate existence and validity of the pramāņas it is possible to carry on a discussion, simply through a temporary mutual acceptance of them as if they did exist and were valid. So it is wrong to say that those who do not believe in their existence cannot legitimately enter into a proper discussion. After referring to the above method of safeguarding the interests of the upholders of the māyā doctrine, Jaya-tirtha says that, whatever may be mutual agreement in a discussion, it remains an undeniable fact
1 vyavahārikam vyavahāra-viṣayo duḥkhādi. Ibid. p. 31.
2 na brūmo vayam na santi pramāṇādīni iti svīkṛtya kathārabhyeti kim nāma santi na santi pramāṇādīni ityasyām cintāyām udāsīnaiḥ yathā svikṛtya tāni bhavata vyavahriyante tatha vyavahāribhir eva kathā pravartyatām. Ibid. p. 32.
3 tac ca vyavahāra-niyama-bandhad eva...sa ca pramanena tarkena ca vyavahartavyam ityādi-rupaḥ; na ca pramāṇādīnām satṭāpi ittham eva tubhyam angikartum ucitā, tādṛśa-vyavahāra-niyama-mātreṇaiva katha-pravṛtteḥ. Ibid.
