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Important Madhva Works Purva-mīmāmsā. The Pūrva-mimāmsā not only practically ignores the existence of God but also denies it. Madhva was himself a great believer in a personal God and therefore wished to interpret the Mīmāṁsā in an authentic manner. He held that the various gods, e.g., Indra or Agni, stood for Vişņu or Nārāyaṇa. The Pūrva-mināmsā was satisfied with providing for heaven as the object of all performance of sacrifices, but with Madhva the ultimate goal was true knowledge and the attainment of emancipation through the grace of God. He disliked the idea that the scriptural sacrifices are to be performed with the object of attaining heaven, and he emphasized his notion that they should be performed without any motive; with him they should be performed merely because they are religious injunctions or the commands of God. He further held that it is only by such motiveless performance of actions that the mind could be purified for the attainment of the grace of God. The motiveless performance of sacrifices is therefore in a way preliminary and accessory to the attainment of wisdom and the grace of God.
Thus, as usual, Madhva tries to refute the argument of the monists against the possibility of possession by God of infinite attributes and in favour of a differenceless Brahma. He further says that the texts such as satyam, jñānam, anantam, Brahma, which apparently inspires a qualityless Brahman, are to be subordinated to other texts which are of a dualistic nature. Proceeding by way of inference, he says that the world, being of the nature of an effect, must have an intelligent cause-a maker-and this maker is God.
The maker of this world must necessarily be associated with omniscience and omnipotence. Madhva cites the evidence of the Bhagavata-purāna in favour of a saguna Brahma, a Brahma associated with qualities. Where the texts refer to Brahman as nirguna, the idea is that the Brahman is not associated with any bad qualities. Also the Brahman cannot be devoid of all determination, viseșa; the denial of determination is itself a determination, and as such would have to be denied by the monists; and this would necessarily lead to the affirmation of the determination. Madhva then resorts to his old arguments against māyā, mithyā, and anirvacanīya, and points out that the logic of excluded middle would rule out the possibility of a category which is neither sat nor asat. There is really no instance of a so-called anirvacanīya. An
