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XXV]
Rāmānuja and Madhva
which may be interpreted as a direct attack upon his predecessor Rāmānuja; but in later times there is evidence of recondite disputes between the followers of the Rāmānuja school and those of the Madhva. For instance, Parakala Yati, in the sixteenth century, wrote Vijayindra-parajaya, which is evidently a treatise containing refutations of some of the most important doctrines of the Madhva philosophy. It seems desirable to give a short account of this treatise, which is rare and available only in a manuscript form.
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Parakala Yati takes his views from Venkata's Tattva-muktākalāpa, and often quotes verses from it in support of his own views. His attack is made upon Madhva's view which discards the Rāmānuja division of categories (dravya, "substance," and adravya, 'non-substance") and his view of the qualities as constituents of the substance; and this forms the subject-matter of the first two sections of the Vijayindra-parājaya.
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In describing Madhva's position upon the question of difference between substance and qualities, the writer says that the Madhvas think that the expression "the blue jug" is justified by the fact that the "blueness" enters into the "sufficient description" of the jug and has no separate existence from it. It is wrong, they say, to affirm that the qualities of the jug stood apart from the jug and entered into it at any particular moment; the conception of the jug carries with it all of its qualities, and these have no separate existence, that is, they are a-prthak-siddha from the jug. Parakāla Yati points out that, since we know that the unqualified jug assumes a blue colour by heat, the blue colour may be regarded as different from the jug1. The qualities, colour etc., have the substance as their support, and they may flow into it or not according to circumstances or conditions. It cannot be said that the determining condition for the influx of qualities is nothing but the nature of the substance, consisting of inseparability from the qualities; for the possibility of such an inseparable association is the matter under dispute and cannot therefore be taken as granted; moreover, the existence of an upādhi is relevant only when the entities are different and when the association of the hetu with the sadhya is true only under certain
1 ghate pakena nailyam utpannam ityananyathā-siddha-pratyakşam ca tatra pramānam kiñca rūpādi svādhikaraṇād bhinnam sväśraye sphäre asya āgamopādhidharmatvāt. Vijayindra-parajaya, p. 3 (MS.).
