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XXII] Māyā and Pradhāna
477 The objection that the distinction of selves depends upon avidyā and the distinction of avidyā upon the distinction of the selves is invalid, for the process is beginningless. The term avyakta refers to avidyā in a generic sense as including all avidyās. The avidyā rests in the individual but is yet dependent upon God as its agent and object. The avidyā cannot come into operation without having the Brahman as its support, though the real nature of the selves is Brahman; yet, so long as they are surrounded by avidyā, they cannot know their real nature.
In reply Bhikṣu says that since without power God alone is unable to create the manifold universe it has to be admitted that God does so by a power distinct from Him, and this power is the prakrti and the puruṣa. If it is said that this power is avidyā, then also since it is a dual factor separate from Brahman that may as much nullify the monistic doctrine as the admission of prakrti and puruşa. It cannot also be said that in the time of pralaya the avidyā is non-existent, for in that case there being only Brahman the world would have to be admitted as coming into being from Brahman alone, and the selves that lie identified with Brahman and one with Him would, even though emancipated, undergo the world-process (samsāra). If it is held that bondage and emancipation are all imaginary, then there is no reason why people should undergo so much trouble in order to attain an imaginary emancipation. If it is held that avidyā may be said to have a secondary or vyavahārika existence at the time of pralaya, and if it is argued that under the circumstances bondage and emancipation may also be regarded as having a merely secondary existence, the view of monism would be unexceptional. But if such an avidyā be admitted which has mere vyavahārika or secondary existence, the same may be supposed with regard to pradhāna. If we inquire into the meaning and significance of the term vyavahārika, we find that its connotation is limited to the power of effectuation and service towards the fulfilment of the purpose. If that is so, then prakrti may also be admitted to have a similar kind of existencel It is true no doubt that the pradhāna is regarded as eternal, but this eternality is an eternality of ceaseless change. Avidyā is regarded by the Vedāntists as apāramārthikā, that is, avidyā is not true
1 pradhāne' pidam tulyam pradhāne artha-kriya-käritva-rupa-vyavahārikasattvasyai'vā'smākam iştattvät. Vijñānā-myta-bhāşya, I. 4. 3.
