________________
534
Appendix to Volume I scope with regard to future associations or even with regard to all past time. If it is urged that the concomitance is between the classcharacter (sāmānya-gocaram) of the probandum (e.g. fire) and the class-character of the reason (e.g. smoke), then it is not necessary that the concomitance of the reason with the probandum should have actually to be perceived at all times by the sense-organs. But if the concomitance is between the class-character of smoke and fire, why should any individual fire be associated with every case of smoke? If the concomitance cannot be perceived by the senseorgans, it cannot be perceived by the mind either, for the mind cannot associate itself with the external objects except through the sense-organs. The concomitance cannot be known through inference, for all inference presupposes it. Thus, there being no way of perceiving concomitance, inference becomes impossible. Again, a concomitance which can lead to a valid inference must be devoid of all conditions; but the absence of such conditions in the past or in the future cannot be perceived at the time of making the inference. Moreover, a condition (upādhi) is defined as that which, having an unfailing concomitance with the probandum, has not the same concomitance with the reason (sādhanā-vyāpakatve sati sādhya-sama-vyāptih)".
Again it is said that an inference is possible only when the reason (e.g. smoke) is perceived to be associated with the object denoted by the minor term (paksa, e.g. hill), but in reality there is no association of the smoke with the hill nor can it be a character of it, for it is a quality of fire. There is no universal agreement between smoke and hill so that one can say that wherever there is a hill there is smoke. Nor can it be said that wherever there is smoke there is both the hill and the fire. When the smoke is first seen it is not perceived as the quality of fire associated with a hill; therefore it is not enough to say that the reason (e.g. smoke) belongs to the minor term (paksa, e.g. hill) as its character (pakşa-dharma), but that the reason belongs to the minor term associated with the probandum. The assertion that in an inference the reason must be known as a quality of the minor term (paksa) has therefore to be interpreted as being a quality of a part of the minor term as associated with the probandum. A valid inference can be made when the two following con
i Sarva-darśana-samgraha, 1.
