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Appendix to Volume I a self is admitted to exist during the lifetime of this body, then since this self is different from the body, and since it is partless and nonphysical by nature, there cannot be anything which can destroy it. No one has ever perceived the self to be burnt or torn to pieces by birds or animals as a dead body can be. Thus, since it has never been found to be destroyed, and since it is not possible to infer any cause which can destroy it, it is to be regarded as immortal. Since the self is eternal, and since it has a present and past association with a body, it is not difficult to prove that it will have also a future association with a body. Thus, self does not reside either in any part of the body or throughout the body, but is all-pervading and behaves as the possessor of that body with which it becomes associated through the bonds of karma. Para-loka or after-life is defined by Jayanta as rebirth or the association of the soul with other bodies after death. The proofs that are adduced in favour of such rebirths are, firstly, from the instinctive behaviour of infants in sucking the mother's breast or from their unaccountable joys and miseries which are supposed to be due to the memory of their past experiences in another birth; and, secondly, from the inequalities of powers, intelligence, temper, character and habits, inequalities in the reaping of fruits from the same kind of efforts. These can be explained only on the supposition of the effects of karma performed in other births.
Sankara, in interpreting the Brahma-sūtra, III. 3. 53, 54, tries to refute the lokayatika doctrine of soullessness. The main points in the lokayatika argument here described are that since consciousness exists only when there is a body, and does not exist when there is no body, this consciousness must be a product of the body. Lifemovements, consciousness, memory and other intellectual functions also belong to the body, since they are experienced only in the body and not outside of it?. To this Sankara's reply is that lifemovements, memory, etc., do not sometimes exist even when the body exists (at death), therefore they cannot be the products of the body. The qualities of the body, such as colour, form, etc., can be
1 Nyāya-mañjarī, pp. 470-473.
2 yad dhi yasmin sati bhavaty asati ca na bhavati tat tad-dharmatvena adhyavasiyate yathā'gni-dharmāv ausnya-prakāśau; prăņa-ceștā-caitanya-smrty'ādayas cā'tma-dharmatvenā'bhimatā ātma-va-dinām te'py antar eva deha upalabhyamānā bahis că' nupalabhyamanā asiddhe deha-vyat irikte dharmini deha-dharmā eva bhavitum arhanti; tasmād avyatireko dehād ātmāna iti. Sankara-bhāşya on Brahma-sūtra, III. 3. 53.
