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The Lokāyata, Nāstika and Cārvāka 537 apply against the Jaina view of inference which is based on the principle of necessary implication (anyathā-nupapattāveva tat-svarūpatvena svīkārāt).
Other objections also made against the possibility of a valid inference are as follows: (1) impressions made by inferential knowledge are dim and not so vivid (aspasțatvāt) as those produced by perception; (2) inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object (svārtha-niscaye parā-pekṣatvāt); (3) inference has to depend on perception (pratyakşa-prvakatvāt); (4) inferential cognitions are not directly produced by the objects (arthād anupajāyamānatvāt); (5) inference is not concrete (avastuvişayatvāt); (6) it is often found contradicted (bādhyamānatvāt); (7) there is no proof which may establish the law that every case of the presence of the hetu should also be a case of the presence of the sādhya (sādhya-sādhanayoḥ pratibandha-sādhaka-pramāņā-bhāvād vā). None of these can be regarded as a reason why inference should be regarded as invalid from the Jaina point of view. For in reply to the first objection it may be pointed out that vividness has never been accepted as a definition of pramāna, and therefore its absence cannot take away the validity of an inference; illusory perceptions of two moons are vivid, but are not on that account regarded as valid. Again, an inference does not always depend on perception, and even if it did, it utilized its materials only for its own use and nothing more. Perception also is produced from certain materials, but is not on that account regarded as invalid. The inference is also produced from objects and is as concrete as perception since like it it involves universals and particulars. Again, false inferences are indeed contradicted, but that is no charge against right inferences. The invariable relationship between a hetu and a sādhya can be established through mental reasoning (tarka).
Jayanta points out in this connection that a law of universal agreement of the sādhya with the hetu has to be admitted. For an inference cannot be due to any mere instinctive flash of intelligence (pratibhā). If a knowledge of invariable and unconditional agreement was not regarded as indispensable for an inference, and if it was due to a mere instinctive flash, then the people of the Cocoanut
i Vädideva Sūri's Syādvāda-ratnākāra, pp. 131, 132. Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1914
2 Ibid.
