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The Lokayata, Nastika and Carvāka
539
ference is not valid is itself an inference based on the similarity of inferential processes with other invalid mental processes. But this does not properly refute the Carvaka position that inductive generalizations are only probable, and that therefore (as Purandara says) they acquire some amount of validity by being corroborated by experience and that they have no force in spheres where they cannot be corroborated by perceptual experience.
Since the Cārvākas do not attribute any more validity to inference than probability, other forms of pramānas, such as the testimony of trusty persons or the scriptures, analogy or implication, also were not regarded as valid. According to Udayana's statement, the Cārvākas denied the existence of anything that was not perceived, and Udayana points out that if this doctrine is consistently applied and people begin to disbelieve all that they do not perceive at any particular time, then all our practical life will be seriously disturbed and upset1. The school of dhūrta Cārvākas, in their Sūtra work, not only denied the validity of inference but criticized the Nyaya categories as enunciated in the Nyaya-sutra, I. I. I, and tried to establish the view that no such enumeration of categories was possible2. It is no doubt true that the Cārvākas admitted perception as the only valid pramāṇa, but since illusions occurred in perception also, ultimately all pramāṇas were regarded as indeterminable by them.
The Carvākas had to contend on the one hand with those who admitted a permanent soul, such as the Jains, the Naiyāyikas, the Samkhya-yoga and the Mīmāmsā, and on the other hand with the idealistic Buddhists who believed in a permanent series of conscious states; for the Carvākas denied all kinds of existence after death. Thus they say that since there is no permanent entity that abides after death, there is no existence after death. As the body, understanding and sense-functions, are continually changing, there cannot be any existence after death, and hence no separate soul can be admitted. According to some, Cārvākas consciousness is prosambhavana-maträt samvädena ca prāmāṇya-bhimānād. Tattva-cintamani Annumiti. For a similar view see Russel, "On the notion of Cause" in his Mysticism and Logic.
1 Udayana's Nyāya-kusumāñjali, III. 5, 6.
2 cārvāka-dhūrtas tu atha'tas tattvam vyākhyāsyāma iti pratijñāya pramāṇaprameya-samkhyā-lakṣaṇa-niyamā-sakya-karaṇīyatvam eva tattvam vyākhyātavan; pramāṇa-samkhyā-niyam-āśakya-karaṇīyatva-siddhaye ca pramiti-bhedān pratyakṣa-di-pramāṇān upajanyān idṛśān upādarśayat. Nyaya-mañjarī, p. 64.
