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The Philosophy of lijñāna Bhikṣu
[CH.
absolutely. This negation of absolute truth may mean that it is not immediate and self-apparent or that it cannot manifest itself as being or that it has no existence in all times. But such limitations are true also of pradhāna. The pradhāna is eternal as changeful, but it is non-eternal in all its products. All the products of prakṛti are destructible; being unintelligent by nature they can never be selfapparent. Again, though pradhana may be said to be existent in any particular form at any particular time, yet even at that time it is non-existent in all its past and future forms. Thus, since vyavahārikatvu cannot mean absolute non-existence (like the hare's horn) and since it cannot also mean absolute existence it can only mean changefulness (pariņāmittva); and such an existence is true of the pradhana. Thus Sankarites do not gain anything in criticizing the doctrine of pradhāna, as a substitute of the avidyā is supposed by them to be endowed with the same characteristics as those of the prakṛti.
It is thus evident that Sankara's criticism against prakrti may well apply to the prakṛti of Iśvara Kṛṣṇa, but it has hardly any application to the doctrine of prakṛti as conceived in the Puranas as interpreted by Bhiksu, where prakṛti is regarded as a power of Brahman. If avidya is also so regarded, it becomes similar to prakṛti. As it is believed to be existent in a potential form in God, even in the pralaya, most of the connotations of avidya that distinguish it from the absolute reality in the Brahman are also the connotations of prakṛti.
According to the view propounded by Bhiksu pradhāna is not regarded as having a separate and independent existence but only as a power of God1.
In explaining Brahma-sūtra 1. 4. 23, Bhiksu points out that Isvara has no other upādhi than prakṛti. All the qualities of Iscara such as bliss, etc., proceed from prakṛti as is shown in Patanjalisutra. Prakṛti is to be regarded as the characteristic nature of Brahman, which is not directly the material cause of the world, but is only the abiding or the ground cause (adhiṣṭhāna-kāraṇa), and prakṛti, as it were, is its own character or part (sciyo bhāraḥ padartha upadhir ity arthah). The relation between this upādhi and prakṛti is one of the controller and the controlled or the possessor
Praky tasya tad-upapattaye pradhānam kāraṇatva-sariravac chaktıvidhayar’vo'cyate na svataniryene ty a radhāryata ity arthaḥ Vijñānā-mṛta-bhaṣya, 1. 4. 4.
