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XXII]
Self-Luminosity and Ignorance 469 the puruşa cannot be regarded as valid knowledge or a pramāņa. In this connection it is also relevant to ask the meaning of the term "avidyā.” If it means an illusory mental state, it must be a state of the buddhi, and its destruction must also belong to the buddhi and not to the puruṣa. If it means the psychical instincts or rootinclinations which are the cause of errors, then also since such rootinstincts belong to the guņas of the prakrti the destruction of such root-instincts must also qualify the prakyti. If it is regarded as a tamas--substance which covers the self, the supposition would be inadmissible, for if the tamas inherent in the buddhi is not removed there cannot be any modification of the buddhi copying the object in it, and if the tamas in the buddhi is once so removed then there cannot be any reflection of it in the puruşa. Thus the view that knowledge leads to the dissolution of the veil of ignorance cannot be supported. The veil is only related to the instruments of knowledge, such as the eye, and cannot therefore be regarded as having anything to do with the pure consciousness. The explanation of the rise of knowledge as being due to the removal of the veil in the pure consciousness cannot therefore be justified. There cannot be any veil in the self. If the self be of the nature of pure consciousness, there cannot be any veil of ignorance inherent in it as the two suppositions are self-contradictory. Again, if it is supposed that the world-appearance is due to the operation of the principle of ignorance or avidyā in the mind and if it is supposed that true knowledge dispels such ignorance, then we are led to the absolutely unwarrantable conclusion that the world may be destroyed by knowledge, or that when one self attains true knowledge the worldappearance as such ceases, or that when emancipation is attained during the lifetime of a saint he will have no experience of the world around him. If it is held that the emancipated saint has still an element of ignorance in him, then the theory that knowledge destroys ignorance has to be given up. Moreover, if the self be regarded as being absolutely unattached to anything (a-sanga), it is wrong to suppose that it would be associated with avidyā or ignorance. The veil can have reference only to the mental states, but it cannot have any relation to pure and unchangeable consciousness; for we have no analogy for such a thing. Again, if it is held that there is natural association of ignorance with pure consciousness, such an association can never be broken off. If such an
