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468 The Philosophy of Vijñāna Bhikṣu [CH.
The transcendental experience of God has also to be explained on the basis of the origin of ordinary experiential knowledge. Through the understanding of the meaning of the scriptural texts and by the processes of Yoga there arises in the buddhi a modification of the form “I am Brahman.” This valid form of modification, being reflected in the puruşa, is revealed as an intuitive apperception of the fact as true self-knowledge belonging to puruṣa. The difference between ordinary experiential knowledge and this knowledge is that it destroys egoism (abhimāna). In such a conception of self-knowledge the objection that the self cannot be both the knower and the known does not hold good; for the self that is known, being a mental state, is different in character from the transcendent self which knows it. The transcendent self as such is the knower, while its reflection in the buddhi as coming back to it is the self that is known?. The objection that the admission of the possibility of self-knowledge stands against the doctrine of the selfluminosity of the self is not valid. The self-luminosity of the self simply means that it shines by itself and does not require the aid of any conditions to manifest itself.
Self-Luminosity and Ignorance. Citsukha has defined self-luminosity as that which not being knowable may yet be treated or felt as immediate (avedyatve sati aparokșa-vyavahāra-yogyatvam). Bhikṣu argues that such a definition of self-luminosity (svaprakasatva) is quite inadmissible. It is nowhere so defined in the Upanişads and it does not follow from the etymology of the word svaprakasatva. The etymology only indicates the meaning “known by itself.” Again, if a thing is not known or cognized, it cannot for that simple reason have any relation to us; and such a meaning would be directly against the scriptural testimony which affirms that the ultimate truth can be apprehended or intuited. It may be suggested that though the Brahma-state of the mind cannot be directly known yet it will have the effect of removing the avidyā in the puruşa. But this is open to various objections. Firstly, the self-luminous is a valid means of knowledge-a pramāņa; but the mere removal of the avidyā from
1 ātmā'pi bimba-rūpena jñātā bhavati svagata-sta-pratibimba-rūpeṇa ca jñeyaḥ. Vijñānā-mrta-bhāsya, I. 1. 3.
