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xx11] Brahma-Experience and Experience 467 modified into a sensory or image-state it is reflected in the puruşa, which then reveals it as a flash of conscious state. It is in this manner that the pure infinite consciousness can manifest itself into finite forms of objects. As the buddhi is constantly transforming itself into various forms and reflecting them on the puruşa from beginningless time there is a continuous flow of conscious states only occasionally punctuated by dreamless sleep. The purusa in its turn is also reflected in the buddhi and thereby gives rise to the notion of ego. In this connection Bhikṣu criticizes the view of Vācaspati that the reflection of the puruṣa in the buddhi is sufficient to explain the cognitive situation, and says that a reflection of consciousness cannot itself be conscious and hence cannot explain why the states of buddhi should appear as conscious. But the assumption that the states of buddhi are reflected in the consciousness explains their real connection with consciousness. It may be said that since it is only the reflections that are associated with consciousness, the things as they exist are not known. The reply to such an objection is that the buddhi-states are but copies of the external objects; and if the copies are intelligized, we have in the validity of such direct acquaintance of the copies the guarantee of their application to objects. It may be said again that when the reflections of the buddhi-states in the consciousness appear as one with it and therefore produce the phenomenon of knowledge we have in such phenomena an illusory unity of the consciousness with the states; our knowledge then becomes illusory. The reply to such an objection is that even if there is an element of illusion in knowledge, that does not touch the reality and validity of the objects to which such knowledge refers. Valid knowledge (pramā) thus consists of this reflection of the buddhi-states in the puruṣa. The fruit of the cognitive process (pramāņa-phala) belongs to the pure consciousness or the purusa who thus behaves as the knower, though he is absolutely unattached to all experiences. The Vaiseșikas lay stress on the appearance of knowledge as produced and destroyed and therefore regard knowledge as being produced or destroyed by the collocation of causes. The reflection of the mental states to puruşa is explained by them as if the knowledge belonged to the self. The Vedāntic epistemological process in which the purusa appears to be the knower and the enjoyer is explained by them as being due to a separate cognitive process called anu-vyavasāya.
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