________________
426
The Nimbārka School of Philosophy
[CH.
cizes the theories of ajñāna and of the illusion in their various aspects. But as the method of the dialectic followed in these logical refutations is substantially the same as that attempted by Venkatanātha and Vyāsatirtha which have been examined in detail it is not necessary to give a detailed study of Mukunda's treatment.
The Pramāņas according to Mādhava Mukunda.
The followers of Nimbārkı admit only three (perception, inference and testimony) out of the following eight pramāņas, viz. perception (pratyakşa), inference (animāna), similarity (upamāna), scriptural testimony (sabda), implication (arthāpatti), non-perception (anupalabdhi), inclusion of the lower within the higher as of ten within a hundred (sambhava), and tradition (aitihya). Perception is of two kinds, external and internal. The external perception is of five kinds according to the five cognitive senses. The mental perception called also the internal perception is of two kinds, ordinary (laukika) and iranscendent (alaukika). The perception of pleasure and pain is a case of ordinary internal perception, whereas the perception of the nature of self, God and their qualities is a case of transcendent internal perception. This transcendent internal perception is again of two kinds, that which flashes forth through the meditation of an entity and that which comes out of meditation on the essence of a scriptural text. 'The scriptural reference that the ultimate truth cannot be perceived by the mind means either that the ultimate truth in its entirety cannot be perceived by the mind or that unless the mind is duly trained by a teacher or by the formation of right tendencies it cannot have a glimpse of the transcendent realities. Knowledge is a beginningless, eternal and all-pervasive characteristic of individual selves. But in our state of bondage this knowledge is like the rays of a lamp in a closed place, in a state of contraction. Just as the rays of a lamp enclosed within a jug may go out through the hole into the room and straight through the door of the room and flood with light some object outside, so the knowledge in each individual may by the modification of the mind reach the senses and again through their modification reach the object and, having flood-lit it, may illuminate both the object and the knowledge. The ajñāna (ignorance) that ceases with the knowledge of an object is the partial cessation of a state of contraction
