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xx11] A General Idea of Vijñāna Bhikṣu's Philosophy 449 the reality of both the purușas, prakrti and its evolutes; and it is because they are emergent forms which have their essence in the Brahman that they can appear as connected together. The movement of the prakrti is also ultimately due to the spontaneous movement of the pure consciousness, the basic reality.
The viveka and the aviveka, the distinction and the nondistinction, are all inherent in buddhi, and this explains why the puruşas fail to distinguish themselves from the buddhi with which they are associated. The association of the purusas with the buddhi implies that it has in it both the characters of distinction and non-distinction. The difficulty is that the “revelation of the distinction” is so opposed by the force of non-distinction that the former cannot find scope for its manifestation. It is the purpose of yoga to weaken the force of the tendency towards non-distinction and ultimately uproot it so that revelation of distinction may manifest itself. Now it may be asked what is the nature of this obstruction. It may be replied that it is merely a negative condition consisting in the non-production of the cognition of the distinction through association with the products of prakyti, such as attachment and antipathy, through which we are continually passing. The Sāmkhya, however, says that the non-production of the distinction is due to the extreme subtleness of the nature of buddhi and purusa which so much resemble each other that it is difficult to distinguish their nature. But this view of the Sāmkhya should not be interpreted as meaning that it is only the subtleness of the natures of these two entities that arrests our discriminating knowledge regarding them. For had it been so, then the process of yoga would be inefficacious in attaining such a knowledge. The real reason is that our association with attachment and antipathy with regard to gross objects obstructs our discriminating vision regarding these subtle entities. Our attachment to gross objects is also due to our long association with sense-objects. A philosopher, therefore, should try to dissociate himself from attachment with gross objects. The whole purpose of creation consists in furnishing materials for the experiences of purușa which seems to undergo all experiential changes of enjoyment and suffering, of pleasure and pain, in and through the medium of buddhi. With the dissociation of buddhi, therefore, all experience ceases. The God is essentially pure consciousness, and though the knowledge of Him as such
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