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436 The Nimbārka School of Philosophy [ch. non-existent, and as such may themselves be regarded as indefinable.
It cannot also be said that indefinability is that of which no sufficient description can be given that “this is such" or that “this is not such," for no such sufficient description can be given of Brahman itself. There would thus be little difference between Brahman and the indefinable. If it is held that "the indefinable" is that regarding the existence of which no evidence can be put forward, then the same may be said about Brahman, because the Brahman being the conceptless pure essence, it is not possible to prove its existence by any proof.
Again, when it is said that the indefinable is that which is neither existent nor non-existent, the meaning of the two terms "existence" and “non-existence" becomes somewhat unintelligible. For “existence" cannot mean only “being” as a class concept, for such a concept does not exist either in Brahman or in the world-appearance. Existence cannot be defined as causal efficiency (artha-kriyākāritra), nor as that which is never contradicted; nor non-existence as that which is contradicted, for the world-appearance which is liable to contradiction is not supposed to be non-existent; it is said to be that which is neither existent nor non-existent. Existence and non-existence cannot also be defined as that which can or cannot be proved, for Brahman is an entity which is neither proved nor unproved. Moreover, the world-appearance cannot be said to be that which is different from all that which can be called "existent" or "non-existent," for it is admitted to have a practical existence (C'yarahārika-sattā). Again, it cannot be urged that if the nature of anything cannot be properly defined as existent or non-existent that it signifies that such an entity must be wholly unreal (atāstava). If a thing is not properly describable as existent or non-existent, that does not imply that it is unreal. The nature of the final dissolution of avidyā cannot be described as existent or not, but that does not imply that such a dissolution is itself unreal and indefinable (nā'nirvācyaśca tat-kşayah).
Again, from the simple assertion that the world is liable to dissolution through knowledge, its falsity does not necessarily follow. It is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys only false ignorance, for knowledge destroys its own negation which has a content similar to that of itself; the knowledge of one thing, say
