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374 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH.
is held that the knowledge which contradicts the illusory notion brought about by the ajñāna destroys it and not the intuition of the reality, then if that contradiction is something identical with pure consciousness, it is the pure consciousness which is to be supposed as destroying the ajñāna; the objections against such a view have already been dealt with. If knowledge and ajñāna are different, then it is wrong to suppose that knowledge destroys ajñāna; for knowledge is the contradiction that is supposed to destroy avidya and by supposition avidyā is not knowledge. Moreover, since that illumination which destroys ajñāna cannot be supposed to have a further veil which is removed by it, it cannot rightly be called knowledge; for knowledge according to the supposition of the Sankarites operates by removing a veil. Further, this knowledge is supposed to be opposed to all things in the world, and if that is so how can it be said that by this knowledge only the ajñāna is destroyed? Again, if it is supposed that illusion consists in identifying everything with Brahman and knowledge is supposed to remove this false identification, then since knowledge is supposed to operate by removing a veil, it has to be supposed that ajñāna was veiling the false identification, and if that were so there could have been no knowledge in our world-experience.
Again, the cessation of avidyā is also incomprehensible in itself, for it cannot be different from the nature of Brahman; if it were there would be duality and emancipation would be impossible. If it were one with the Brahman, then being so it would exist always and there would be no scope for making any effort about it. It cannot also be said that avidya and Brahman mutually negate each other; for avidyā has Brahman for its support and as such is not antagonistic to it.
Prapatti Doctrine as expounded in Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa of Lokācārya and Saumya Jāmātṛ Muni's Commentary on it.
According to the Śrīvacana-bhūṣaṇa the mercy of God remains always as submerged in His justice, but yet it always exists and its apprehension by us is obstructed by certain conditions. It is not produced by our efforts, for then God would not always be merciful (anudbhūta-dayā-dy-udbhāvaka-puruṣa-kāra-sāpekṣakatve nityo-dbhūta-dayā-di-mattvam vyāhatam syāt 35. B.).
