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372 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH. it has produced the cessation (na ca sva-janyatvam eva sva-sādhyatvam). If the two concepts are regarded as identical, then the relationing of avidyā to which avidyā may be regarded as a means would also have to be admitted as being produced by avidyā, which is reasoning in a circle!. Arguing on the same analogy, one might as well say that the cessation of the relationing with avidyā depends on the cessation of avidyā, but in that case since the cessation of avidyā itself means a relationing with avidyā it becomes a tautology only.
Again, in order to differentiate any ordinary erroneous view, which is removed by right knowledge from aridyā, it has been defined as being beginningless yet destructible by knowledge. Now, it may be asked, what is the nature of this knowledge which destroys avidyā? Does it mean pure consciousness or only mental states? If it is pure consciousness, then it cannot destroy the root-impressions (samskāra); for it is only the mental states (rrtti) which can destroy the mental root-impressions, and if avidyā is a beginningless samskāra it cannot be removed by knowledge as pure consciousness and thus the assumption of its being beginningless serves no useful purpose. The second supposition, that knowledge which destroys avidyā is only a mental state, cannot also be correct, for it is held that knowledge as mental state can remove only the veil of ajñāna but not the ajñāna itself. If it is said that the mental state removes both the veil and the ajñāna, then the definition of ajñāna as that which can be removed by knowledge becomes too wide, as it would also signify the veil (ārarana) which is not intended to be covered within the definition of ajñāna. Again, if ajñānas are regarded as many, then such cognitive states can remove only the ajñānas veiling the ordinary objects, and cannot therefore be applied to one undifferentiated ajñāna-whole which can be removed only by the intuition of the partless real, for this knowledge would not be a mental state which is always limited?. Here also the ajñāna must be supposed to be hiding the nature of Brahman, and the cessation of the ajñāna is directly consequent upon the cessation of the veil. So, firstly, the direct cause of the cessation of the ajñāna is not knowledge but the removal of the veil; secondly, it is the removal of the veil that is caused by the knowledge, and so it is this that ought to be called ajñāna according to the definition, for the veil is both beginningless and destructible by knowledge. i Sad-vidyā-vijaya, p. 16.
Ibid.
