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Rāmānujadāsa alias Mahācārya
371
avidya cannot be regarded as ultimately real (pāramārthiki) for then there would be no monism. It cannot be regarded as the stuff of all that is cognized in practical experience (vyavahārikī), for then it could not be called the stuff of illusory experiences. It is sometimes urged that even from false things, such as a false fear, there may be real illness or even death, and so even from ignorance there can be real knowledge. Mahācārya points out that this analogy is false, for even in the above instances it is knowledge that produces the said results. If avidyā is false, then all its material transformations must also be false, for the effect is always identical with the cause. It is urged that since the world-objects are false their knowledge must also be false; then the Brahman, which is the knowledge which is itself a product of avidya, is also false.
Further, if ajñāna be regarded as one, then with the knowledge of conch-shell all ajñāna should cease; for without the cessation of ajñāna the conch-shell could not have been known. It cannot be said that with the knowledge of the conch-shell only the veil hiding it has been removed and that the ajñāna did not cease, for experience testifies to the disappearance of ajñāna and not that of the veil. Thus one is forced to admit the existence of many ajñānas. For if it is held that knowledge removes only the veil, then even the last emancipating knowledge would also remove only a particular veil and that would not result in the destruction of the ultimate ajñāna. Again, ajñāna is defined as that which is destroyed by knowledge (jñāna). If that is so, it is obviously wrong to define knowledge as being itself a product of ajñāna. The effect cannot destroy the causal entity. Again, if at the time of emancipation of a man the ajñāna is supposed to be destroyed, such an ajñāna if it is one only would be wholly destroyed and there would be no other ajñāna left which could bind the other unemancipated individuals. It is supposed that ajñāna must be false, for it is destroyed by knowledge, but at the same time it is admitted that the ajñāna is destroyed by the true scriptures (śruti), and when a thing is destroyed by another real and true entity the former cannot be regarded as false.
Again, avidya is sometimes defined as something the cessation of which can be produced by knowledge (jñānajanya). Now Brahman is itself the cessation of avidya, but it is not produced by knowledge. If knowledge is regarded as a means to the cessation of knowledge (jñānasādhyatvät), then it does not necessarily mean that
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