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408 The Nimbārka School of Philosophy [CH. Brahman is self-luminous, how can it be hidden and how can there be any illusion about it? If the conch-shell shines forth in its own nature, there cannot be any misperception of its nature as a piece of silver. Again, if the nature of Brahman is admitted to be hidden by ajñāna, the question that naturally arises is whether the ajñāna veils the nature of the Brahman as a whole or in part. The former supposition is impossible, for then the world would be absolutely blindand dark(jagad-āndhya-prasangāt), and the latter is impossible, for the Brahman is a homogeneous entity and has no characters or parts. It is admitted by the monists to be absolutely qualityless and partless. If it is held that ordinarily only the "bliss" part of the Brahman is hidden by ajñāna whereas the “being" part remains unveiled, then that would mean that Brahman is divisible in parts and the falsity of the Brahman would be demonstrable by such inferences as: Brahman is false, because it has parts like the jug (brahma mithyā sāmšatrāt, ghațādivat).
In reply to the above objections it may be argued that the objections against ajñāna are inadmissible, for the ajñāna is absolutely false knowledge. Just as an owl perceives utter darkness, even in bright sunlight, so the intuitive perception “I am ignorant” is manifest to all. Anantarāma, a follower of the Nimbārka school, raises further objections against such a supposition in his l'edāntatattra-bodha. He says that this intuitively felt "I" in "I am ignorant" cannot be pure knowledge, for pure knowledge cannot be felt as ignorant. It cannot be mere egoism, for then the experience would be “the egoism is ignorant.” If by "ego" one means the pure self, then such a self cannot be experienced before emancipation. The ego-entity cannot be something different from both pure consciousness and ajñāna, for such an entity must doubtless be an effect of ajñāna which cannot exist before the association of the ajñāna with Brahman. The reply of the Sankarites that ajñāna, being merely false imagination, cannot affect the nature of the Brahman, the abiding substratum (adhisthāna), is also inadmissible; for if the ajñāna be regarded as false imagination there must be someone who imagines it. But such an imagination cannot be attributed to either of the two possible entities, Brahman or the ajñāna; for the former is pure quality less which cannot therefore imagine and the latter is inert and unconscious and therefore devoid of all imagination. It is also wrong to suppose that Brahman
