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The Philosophy of Y'āmunācārya [CH. the blue colour; so the world and the individuals may also be conceived in accordance with the teaching of the Upanişads as being inseparably related to Him. This meaning is, indeed, more legitimate than the conception which would abolish all the world manifestation, and the personality of all individual persons, and would remain content only to indicate the identity of their pure intelligence with the pure intelligence of Brahman. There is not any pure, all-absorbing, qualityless intelligence, as the Sankarites assert; for to each of us different and separate ideas are being directly manifested, e.g. our feelings of individual pleasures and pains. If there were only one intelligence, then everything should have shone forth simultaneously for all times. Again, this intelligence is said to be both Being (sat), intelligence (cit), and bliss (ānanda). If this tripartite form be accepted, it will naturally destroy the monistic doctrine which the Sankarites try to protect so zealously. If, however, they assert that these are not separate forms or qualities, but all three represent one identical truth, the Brahman, then that also is not possible; for how can bliss be the same as intelligence? Pleasure and intelligence are experienced by all of us to be entirely different. Thus, in whichever way we try to scrutinize the Sankarite doctrines, we find that they are against all experiences and hardly stand the strain of a logical criticism. It has, therefore, to be admitted that our notions about the external world are correct and give us a true representation of the external world. The manifold world of infinite variety is therefore not merely an illusory appearance, but true, as attested by our sense-experience.
Thus the ultimate conclusion of Yamuna's philosophy demonstrates that there are, on the one side, the self-conscious souls, and, on the other, the omniscient and all powerful Isvara and the manifold external world. These three categories are real. He hints in some places that the world may be regarded as being like sparks coming out of Isvara; but he does not elaborate this thought, and it is contradicted by other passages, in which Isvara is spoken of as the fashioner of the world sustem, in accordance with the Vyāya doctrine. From the manner in which he supports the Nyāya position with regard to the relation of Isvara and the world, both in the Siddhi-trava and in the Agama-prāmīnya, it is almost certain that his own attitude did not differ much from the Nuova attitude, which left the duality of the world and Israra absolutely unre
