________________
242 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [ch. only by the content of knowledge, and since such an object is denied in the case of illusory perception where we have such a knowledge, what is the guarantee that the object should be present in other cases? In those cases also it is the knowledge that alone should determine the presence of the object. That is to say, that if knowledge alone is to be the guarantor of the corresponding object, it is not right to say in two instances where such knowledge occurs that the object exists in one case and not in the other
In refuting the anirvacunīya-khyāti Meghanādāri says that if it is supposed that in illusions an indefinable silver is produced which is mistaken for real silver, then that is almost the same as the anyathā-khyāti view, for here also one thing is taken as another. Moreover, it is difficult to explain how the perception of such an indefinable silver would produce the real desire for picking it up which is possible only in the case of the perception of real silver. A desire which can be produced by a real object can never be produced by a mere illusory notion. Nor can there be any similarity between a mere illusory notion and the real shining entity, viz. silver. The so-called indefinable silver is regarded either as being of the nature of being and non-being, or as different from being and non-being, both of which are impossible according to the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that such an extra-logical entity is possible, it would be difficult to conceive how it could have any similarity with such a positive entity as ordinary silver. It cannot be admitted that this complex of being and non-being is of the nature of pure vacuity, for then also it would be impossible to conceive any similarity between a vacuum entity and real silver".
1 na ca tadbajjñāne'striti väcyam. tad-ākārasya satyatte bhrāntitrā-nupapattih asattue tu na tasya jñānā-kärata. tucchasya vasta-akārată-nupapatteh. tad-ākāratze ca khyātir eva tucche'ti suktikādau na rajatā-rthi-praurttih. Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-mani (MS.).
The general drift of Meghanādāri's theme may be summed up in the words of Anantācārya in his jñāna-yathārthya-vāda (MS.) as follows: "tathā ca rajatatrum sukti-nistha- 'işayatā-vacchedakatta-bhūrai'at sukty-aurttitrāt j'o jud-auritih sa tan-nistha-dharma-nirūpitā-vacchedakatta-bhatar'un iti sumanya-''āptau dandanistha-kāranatā-z'acchedakatta-bhātavad danda-artti ghatatradikam drstāntah."
2 "tasya'nirtācya-rajatatayā grahaņād tiparita-khyāti-paksa-patah... samyag-rajata-dhir hi pratytti-hetuh... tasya pratity-atmaka-z'asti'-ātmakajor bhuisvaratrā-di-sādrsya-bhāvāt." Ibid.
sekasya yugapat sad-asadā-tmaka-ciruddha-dharmavattvā-nupapatteh. tadupapattāv api sādrsy-nupa patteśca...śünya-vastuni prumāņu-bhāvāt. tut-sudbhūve'pi tasya rajata-sadrsya-bhāvāccu tato na pravrttih. Ibid.
