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xx] The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge 247 be possible without its being based on a relation of correspondence to an objective entity. The content of knowledge must therefore have a direct correspondence with the objective entity to which it refers. Thus, since there is a perception of silver (in the illusory perception of conch-shell-silver), it must refer to an objective substratum corresponding to it? The Mīmāmsā supposition that errors are produced through non-discrimination of memory-image and perception is also wrong, because in that case we should have the experience of remembering silver and not of perceiving it as an objective entity before usa. Both Meghanādāri and Anantācārya take infinite pains to prove that their definition of error applies to all cases of illusions of diverse sorts, including dreams, into the details of which it is unnecessary for our present purposes to enter 3.
The Doctrine of Self-validity of Knowledge. Pramāņa, or valid knowledge, is defined as the cognition of objects as they are (tathā-bhūtā-rtha-jñānam hi pramānam ucyate), and apramāņa, or invalid knowledge, is described as cognition representing a wrong notion of an object (a-tathā-bhūtā-rtha-jñānam hi a-pramāņam). Such a validity, it is urged by Meghanādāri, is manifested by the knowledge itself (tathātvā-vadhāraņā-tmakam prāmānyam ātmanai'va niścīyate). This does not expose it to the criticism that knowledge, being passive, cannot at the same moment be also regarded as active, determining its own nature as valid (na ca karma-kartytā-virodhaḥ); for since it is of the nature of a faithful representation of the object, the manifestation of its own nature as such is an affirmation of its validity. If knowledge had no power by itself of affirming its own validity, there would be no way by which such a validity could be affirmed, for the affirmation of its validity by any other mediate process, or through any other instrumentality, will always raise the same question as to how the testimony of those processes or instruments can be accepted. For on such a supposition, knowledge not being self-valid, each such testimony has to be
1 tathā ca rajatatvam śukti-niştha-vișayatā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavat suktyavrttitvāt yo yad-avrttih sa tan-niştha-dharma-nirūpitā-vacchedakatvā-bhāvavāniti. jñāna-yātharthya-vāda (MS.).
2 rajata-smarane idam-padārtha-grahaņa-rūpa-jñāna-dvaya-kalpane rajatam smarāmi'ti tatrā'nubhava-prasangah, na tu rajatam paśyāmiti, sākşat-kāratvavyañjaka-visayatāyāḥ smarane'bhävät. Ibid.
3 (a) Ibid. (6) Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-mani.
