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328 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [Ch. known by inference, and in cases of such perception as “I am ignorant," "I do not know myself or anything else," there is obviously perceptual experience of ajñāna. It is, therefore, impossible that “I” should perceive and be at the same time ignorant. Perception of ignorance would thus be absurd. Again, the experience of a negation necessarily must refer to a locus, and this implies that there is a knowledge of the locus and that this would contradict the experience of a universal negation which is devoid of all knowledge. It may, however, be urged that the perception of ignorance is not the experience of a negation, but that of a positive entity, and so the objections brought forward in the above controversy would not apply to it.
To this the reply is that the admission of a positive category called ajñāna which is directly experienced in perception may imply that it is of an entity which is opposed to knowledge; for the negative particle “a”.in “ajñāna" is used either in the sense of absence or negation. If it does so, it may well be urged that experience of opposition implies two terms, that which opposes and that to which there is an opposition. Thus, the experience of ajñāna would involve the experience of knowledge also, and, therefore, when the opposite of ajñāna shines forth, how can ajñāna be perceived? It is clear, therefore, that no advantage is gained by regarding ajñāna as a positive entity instead of a mere negation. The conception of a positive ajñāna cannot serve any new purpose which is not equally attainable by the conception of it as negation of knowledge. If a positive entity is regarded as able to circumscribe or limit the scope of manifestation of Brahman, a negation also may do the same. The Sankarites themselves adınit that knowledge shines by driving away the ignorance which constituted the negation-precedent-to the production of (prāga-bhāra) knowledge, and thus in a way they admit that ajñāna is of the nature of negation. The supposed experience of dullness (mugdhu'smi) involves in it the notion of an opposition. The mere fact that the word "dull” (mugdha) has no negative particle in it does not mean that it has no negative sense. Thus, a positive ignorance cannot be testified by perception.
It has been suggested that the existence of ajñāna may be proved by inference on the supposition that if light manifests itself hy driving away darkness, so knowledge must shine by driving away
