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Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH.
lead to the self-validity of knowledge. The theory of self-validity that it is caused by the same constituents which produce the knowledge is also inadmissible, for the senses have also to be regarded as the cause of knowledge and these may be defective. Again, it is held that knowledge which corresponds with the object (tathā-bhūta) is valid and that which does not correspond with the object is invalid and that such validity and invalidity are therefore directly manifested by the knowledge itself. Meghanādāri replies that if such correspondence be a quality of the object, then that does not establish the validity of knowledge; if it is a quality of knowledge, then memory has also to be regarded as self-valid, for there is correspondence in it also. Again, the question arises whether the self-validity is merely produced or also known. In the former case the self-manifestation of self-validity has to be given up, and in the latter case the Kumārila view is indefensible for by it knowledge being itself an implication from the revelation of objects its selfvalidity cannot obviously be self-manifested.
Meghanādāri, therefore, contends that an intuition (anubhuti) carries with it its own validity; in revealing the knowledge it also carries with it the conviction of its own validity. The invalidity, on the other hand, is suggested by other sources. This intuition is in itself different from memory1. The whole emphasis of this contention is on his view that each cognition of an object carries with it its cognizability as true, and since this is manifested along with the cognition, all cognitions are self-valid in this sense. Such a selfvalidity is therefore not produced since it is practically identical with the knowledge itself. Meghanādāri points out that this view is in apparent contradiction with Rāmānuja's own definition of svataḥ-prāmāṇya as that which is produced by the cause of knowledge; but Rāmānuja's statement in this connection has to be interpreted differently, for the knowledge of God and the emancipated beings being eternal and unproduced any view which defines selfvalidity as a production from the same source from which knowledge is produced would be inapplicable to them 2.
Time. Time according to Meghanādāri is not to be regarded as a separate entity. He takes great pains to show that Ramanuja has 1 anubhutitvam vā prāmāṇyam astu; tac ca jñānā-vāntara-jātiḥ; sā ca smṛtijñāna-jātitaḥ prthaktayā lokataḥ eva siddhā; anubhūteḥ svasattaya eva sphūrteḥ. Naya-dyu-mani, p. 31.
2 Ibid. p. 38.
