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356 Philosophy of the Ramanuja School of Thought [CH
anything abstract, but it means the concrete assemblages of parts that stand beside one another in memory. Venkata, however, points out that the notion of "universal" does not necessarily mean that it can be with regard to assemblages of parts only, for in case of those partless entities, such as qualities, there cannot be any assemblage of parts, yet the notion of universals is still quite applicable. It is for this reason that Venkata makes "similarity" only as the condition of "universals" and does not include assemblages of parts (samsthāna) as is done by Rāmānujācārya.
Svataḥ-prāmānya (self-validity). It is sometimes argued that as in all things so in the determination of validity and invalidity the application of the methods of agreement and difference is to be regarded as the decisive test. The presence of qualities that contribute to validity and the absence of defects that make any perception invalid is to be regarded as deciding the validity or invalidity of any perception. To this Rāmānujācārya says that the ascertainment of qualities that contribute to validity cannot be determined without an assurance that there are no defects, and the absence of defects cannot also be known without the knowledge of the presence of qualities that contribute towards validity; and so, since they mutually depend upon each other, their independent determination is impossible. Thus the suggestion is that there is neither the determination of validity nor invalidity, but there is doubt. To this the reply is that unless something is known there cannot be any doubt. So there is a middle stage before the determination of validity or invalidity. Before it is known that the knowledge corresponds with the object or does not do so, there must be the manifestation of the object (artha-prakāśa) which, so far as it itself is concerned, is self-valid and does not depend for its validity upon the application of any other method; for it is the basis of all future determinations of its nature as true or false. So this part of knowledge-the basic part-the manifestation of objects-is selfvalid. It is wrong to say that this knowledge is in itself characterless (niḥsvabhava), for it is of the nature of the manifestation of an objective entity like the determination of tree-ness before its specific nature as a mango or a pine tree1. The knowledge of the contri
1yatha-rtha-paricchedaḥ pramanyam ayatha-rtha-paricchedaḥ aprāmāṇyam katham tad-ubhaya-parityage artha-pariccheda-siddhiḥ iti cen na, aparityājyatvābhyupagamat. tayoḥ sadhāraṇam eva hy artha-paricchedam brūmaḥ śimsapāpalāśā-dişu iva vykṣatvam. Nyaya-kulisa. MS.
