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xx] Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 329 positive ignorance. Now inference is a mode of knowledge and as such it must drive away some ignorance which was hiding its operation. Since this ajñāna could not manifest itself, it must imply some other ajñāna which was hiding it, and without driving which it could not manifest itself, and there would thus be infinite regress. If the ajñāna be regarded as hiding, then the inference may as well be regarded as destroying the ignorance directly. Whenever a knowledge illuminates some contents, it may be regarded as dispelling the ignorance regarding it. The scriptural texts also do not support the conception of a positive ajñāna. Thus, the concept of a positive ajñāna is wholly illegitimate.
Fortieth Objection. The supposition that the ajñāna rests in the individual jivas and not Brahman is also false. If the ajñāna is supposed to rest in the individual in its own real essence (i.e. as Brahman), then the ajñāna would virtually rest in Brahman. If it is supposed that ajñāna rests in the individual jīvas, not in their natural state but in their ordinarily supposed nature as suffering rebirth, etc., then this amounts to saying that the ajñāna is associated with the material stuff and as such can never be removed; for the material limitations of an individual can never have a desire to remove the ajñāna, nor has it the power to destroy it. Again, it may be asked whether the ajñāna that constitutes the difference of individual jīvas is one or many in different cases. In the former case in the emancipation of one, ajñāna would be removed and all would be emancipated. In the second case it is difficult to determine whether avidya comes first or the difference between individual jīvas, and there would thus be anyonya-śraya, for the Sankarites do not admit the reality of difference between jivas. In the theory that ajñāna is associated with Brahman, the difference between jīvas being false, there is no necessity to admit the diversity of ajñāna according to the diversity of jivas. In any case, whether real or fictitious, avidya cannot explain the diversity of the jivas. Again, if the ajñānas which are supposed to produce the diversity of the jīvas be supposed to exist in the Brahman, then Brahman cannot be known. In the view that these ajñānas exist in the jivas, the old difficulty comes in as to whether the difference of avidyās is primary or whether that of the jivas is primary. If the difficulty is intended to be solved by suggesting that the regression is not vicious as in the case of the seed and the shoot, then it may be pointed out that
