________________
xx]
Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School
331 for they certainly do admit the beginningless world-creation to be due to the operation of defects. If the avidya is not itself an illusory imposition, then it will be either true or chimerical. If it is regarded as both an illusory construction and a product, then it would not be beginningless. If it has a beginning, then it cannot be distinguished from the world-appearance. If illusion and its construction be regarded as identical, then also the old difficulty of the avidyā generating itself through its own construction would remain the same. Again, if the avidyā appears to Brahman without the aid of any accessory defect, then it will do so eternally. If it is urged that, when the avidya ceases, its manifestation would also cease, then also there is a difficulty which is suggested by the theory of the Sankarites themselves; for we know that in their theory there is no difference between the illumination and that which is illuminated and that there is no causal operation between them. That which is being illuminated cannot be separated from the principle of illumination.
If it is urged that the avidya is manifested so long as there is no dawning of true knowledge, then may it not be said that the negation-precedent-to the rise of true knowledge is the cause of world-appearance and that the admission of avidya is unnecessary? If it is said that the negation cannot be regarded as the cause of the very varied production of world-appearances, then it can be urged with as much force that the position may also be regarded as capable of producing the manifold world-appearance. If it is held that positive defects in the eye often produce many illusory appearances, then it may also be urged on the other side that the nonobservation of distinctions and differences is also often capable of producing many illusory appearances. If it is urged that negation is not limited by time and is therefore incapable of producing the diverse kinds of world-appearances under different conditions of time, and that it is for that reason that it is better to admit positive ignorance, then also it may be asked with as much force how such a beginningless ignorance unconditioned by any temporal character can continue to produce the diverse world-appearance conditioned in time till the dawning of true knowledge. If in answer to this it is said that such is the nature and character of avidyā, then it may well be asked what is the harm in admitting such a nature or character of "negation." This, at least, saves us from admitting a strange and
