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Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 339
negation of both avidya and its cessation, being eternal, there ought to be no illusory world-creation at any time.
If the cessation of avidya is not itself of illusory nature and if it is regarded as included in the being of Brahman, then Brahman being beginningless the avidyā should be regarded as having always remained arrested. It cannot be said that the existence of Brahman is itself the cessation of ajñāna, for then it would be impossible to connect the cessation of avidyā with the realization of the nature of Brahman as cause and effect.
If it is suggested that a mental state reflecting the nature of Brahman represents the cessation of ajñāna of Brahman and that this mental state may be removed by other causes, then the reply is that this would mean that such a mental state is illusory; and this implies that the cessation of avidya is illusory. The criticism of such a view is given above. The cessation of avidya is not real, being outside Brahman; neither real, something different from real, and unreal, for that could not lead to a real cessation. So ultimately it must be neither unreal nor something different from any of the above entities, for the cessation of positive and negative entities only are of the nature of real and unreal. Ajñāna is something different from real and unreal; its cessation is valid, being amenable to proofs. So the cessation has to be admitted as being something unique and different from all existent and non-existent entities. In reply it may be said that if the ajñāna is admitted to be like-anon-existent entity (asativa), then in both the two meanings of negation, that is, in the view that negation is but the other name of position and that negation is a separate category in itself, the admission of avidya would involve dualism. If it is regarded as something chimerical, it could never show itself, and such a chimerical entity would have no opposition to the world-cycle. So the cessation of avidya cannot lead to emancipation. Again, if the cessation of avidya is non-existent, that would imply the existence of avidya. The cessation of avidya is not like the destruction of a jug which has a real existence, so that though it may appear like a non-being, yet the jug may be regarded as a positive entity. The destruction of avidya is not of that nature, for it has no definite form. If it is held that the cessation of avidya is of the fifth type, that is, different from existent, non-existent, existent-and-non-existent and differentfrom-existent-and-non-existent, then this is virtually the admission
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