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334 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought (CH. be without any support. If further supports are conceived, then there would be a vicious infinite. Again, if it is held that what is false does not require any support, then it may be urged that according to the Sankarites the support is regarded as the basis on which the illusion occurs, and even the jug is regarded as an illusion on the ground. Moreover, this false experience of avidyā is not any of the illusory or limited perceptions, such as ego-experience or the experience of other mental states; for these are regarded as the effects of avidyā. If they are not so, then they must be due to some other defects, and these to other ones, and so there would be a vicious infinite. If it is held that avidyā is nothing different from its experience, then since all experience is of the nature of Brahman, Brahman itself would be false. Again, if the avidyā manifests itself as Brahman by hiding its (Brahman) nature, then all pure revelation being hidden and lost, aridyā itself, which is manifested by it, would also be naturally lost. If it be manifested as Brahman and its own nature be hidden, then Brahman alone being manifested there would be no question of bondage. It is obvious that it cannot manifest itself both as aridyā and as Brahman, for that would be self-contradictory, since knowledge always dispels ignorance. If it is held that just as a mirror reflects an image in which the character of the mirror and the real face is hidden, so avidyā may manifest itself and hide both itself and the Brahman. To this the reply is that in all cases of illusions of identity (tādātmyā-dhyāsa) the non-observation of the difference is the cause of the error. The cause of the illusion of the face and the mirror is the non-observation of the fact that the face is away from the mirror. But Brahman and avidyā are neither located in a proximate space so that it is possible to compare their illusion of identity by the illustration of other illusions which depend upon such proximity. If it is said of avidyā, not being a substance, that all criticism that applies to real and existent entities would be inapplicable to it, then such a doctrine would be almost like nihilism, for all criticisms against nihilism are accepted by nihilists as not invalidating their doctrine.
Forty-second Objection. It is held by the Sankarites that aridyā and māyā are two distinct conceptions. Jlāyā is supposed to be that by which others are deluded, and aridyā is supposed to be that which deludes one's self. The word māyā is used in various senses but none of these seems to satisfy the usage of the word in Sankarite
