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xx] Dialectical criticism against the Sankara School 333
racter of avidya belongs to Brahman, the Brahman being eternal, there would never be a time when avidya would not shine. The shiningness cannot also be regarded as a character of either Brahman or the avidya, for none of them is regarded as being a knower of it. If it is urged that the character as the knower is the result of an illusory imposition, then the objection is that the meaning of such an imposition is unintelligible unless the conception of avidya is clarified. The character as knower is possible only on the supposition of an illusory imposition, and on the above supposition the illusory imposition becomes possible on the supposition of the knower. If it is due to Brahman, then Brahman, being eternal, the illusory impositions would also be eternal. If it be without any reason, then the entire world-illusion would be without any cause.
Again, any conception regarding the support of avidyā is unintelligible. If it has no support, it must be either independent like Brahman or be like chimerical entities. If it has a support and if that support be of the nature of Brahman, then it is difficult to conceive how the eternally pure Brahman can be the support of the impure avidya which is naturally opposed to it. If the solution is to be found in the supposition that the impure avidyā is false, then it may well be urged that if it is false there is no meaning in the effort to make it cease. If it is said in reply that though it is nonexistent yet there is an appearance of it, and the effort is made to make that appearance cease, then also the reply is that the appearance is also as false as itself. If it is admitted that though false it can yet injure one's interest, then its falsehood would be only in name, for its effects are virtually admitted to be real. If Brahman in its limited or conditioned aspect be regarded as the support of avidya, then since such a limitation must be through some other avidya this would merely bring us into confusion. If it is held that avidyā has for its support an entity quite different from Brahman conditioned or unconditioned, then the view that Brahman is the support of avidya has to be given up, and there would be other difficulties regarding the discovery of another support of this support. If it be said that like Brahman avidya is its own support but Brahman is not its own support, then the support of avidya would have no other support. If it is said that the support can be explained on the basis of conditions, then also it would be difficult to imagine how a condition of the nature of a receptacle (ādhārā-kāro-padhi) can itself
