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Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH.
sensation does not involve the tactile; nor does it refer merely to the tactile, as that does not involve colour. Perception, therefore, refers to an entity to which both the colour and the tactile qualities belong. Such a perception of recognition also repudiates the Buddhist view of the conglomeration of entities. For such a view naturally raises the question as to whether the conglomeration is different from or the same as the entities that conglomerate. In the latter case there cannot be any recognition of the object as one entity to which both the colour and the tactile quality belong. In the former case, when conglomeration is regarded as extraneous to the conglomerated entities, such a conglomeration must either be positive or negative. In the first alternative it amounts virtually to an admission of substances, for the assumption of the existence of merely the complex characters is inadmissible, since there cannot be anything like that which is neither a substance, nor quality, nor a qualifying relation. In the second alternative, if the conglomeration (samghāta) is nonexistent, then it cannot produce the recognition. If conglomeration be defined as absence of interval between the perceived qualities, then also, since each sense quality has an appeal only to its own specific sense-organ, it is impossible that the perception of two different sense-qualities by two different organs should point to a common entity. Conglomeration cannot also be defined as spatial identity, for it must also involve temporal identity in order to give the notion of conglomeration. It cannot also be said that time and space are identical, for such a view which is true of momentariness, will be shown to be false by the refutation of momentariness. Space cannot also be of the nature of ākāśa, which in the Buddhist view means unobstructedness and is not a positive concept. Space cannot also be regarded as material identity with the sense-qualities, for the different sense-qualities are regarded as the unique nature of different moments1. If it means that the different sensible qualities have but one material behind them, that amounts to the admission of substance2. If the sensible qualities be regarded as a conglomeration on account of their existence in the same material object, then the material object would have to be described as a conglomeration by virtue of the existence of its elemental entities
1
na co'pādāna-rupaḥ sparśa-rūpādīnām bhinna-svalakṣaṇo-pādānatvā-bhyupagamāt. Tattva-mukta-kalapa, Sarvartha-siddhi, p. 9.
2 eko-pādānatve tu tad eva dravyam. Ibid.
