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258 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH. to this is that the association of pure intelligence with worldly objects is through the instrumentality of kurma. It is also not possible to infer the existence of Manas as a separate category through the possibility of the thinking operation, for this may well be explained by the functioning of the subconscious root-impressions; for even the assumption of mind would not explain the thinking operation, since manas, by itself, cannot be regarded as capable of producing thought. Manas, being merely an instrument, cannot be regarded as playing the role of a substance of which thought may be regarded as a modification. In the state of dream also it is not necessary to assume the existence of a separate category of ahamkāra to explain dream experiences, for this may well be done by mind working in association with subconscious root-impression. The breathing operation in deep, dreamless sleep may also be explained by ordinary bio-motor functions, and for this there is no necessity for the assumption of mahat.
It is also wrong to suppose that the cause must be of a more unlimited extent than the effect, for it is not testified in ordinary experience, in which a big jug is often found to be made out of a lump of clay of a smaller size. It is also wrong to suppose that whatever is found to abide in an effect must also be found in its cause (na hi yad yenā'nugatam tat tasya kāraṇam iti ni yamah), for the various qualities that are found in a cow are never regarded as its cause. Following the same assumption, one would expect to find a separate cause of which the common characteristics of the prakrti and its evolutes are the effects, and this would involve the adinission of another cause of the prakrti itself (vyaktā-r'yakta-sādhāranadharmāņām tad-ubhaya-kārana-prasangāt tathā ca tattvā-dhikyaprasangaḥ). Thus, the argument that an effect must have as its cause qualitative entities that inhere in it is false. The earthiness (mrttra) which inheres in the jug is not its cause, and the earthy substance (mrd-dravya) which shows itself in its unmodified form or its modified forin as jug cannot be said to be inherent in the jug. Again the argument that things which are related as cause and effect have the same form is also false; for if this sameness means identity, then no distinction can be made between cause and effect. If this sameness means the existence of some similar qualities, then there may be such similarity with other things (which are not cause and effect) as well. Again applying the same analogy to the Sāmkhya doctrine
