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xx] Ontological categories according to Venkațanātha 271 special function to fulfil, it is without any causal efficiency and as such is non-existent; and, on the other hand, since each succeeding entity rises into being without waiting for any cause, it may rise into being in the preceding moment as well, and if this is so there would be no series at all. Again it is argued that since whatever is produced must necessarily be destroyed, destruction as such is unconditioned and takes place without awaiting any cause. Negation can be unconditioned only when it is an implication of position which as such is never produced but is always associated with any and every position (e.g. cow implies the negation of a horse). But negations which are produced always depend on certain causes which can produce them just as much as any positive entity, as in the case of the destruction of a jug by the stroke of a stick. If it is argued that the stroke of a stick does not produce any destruction but only starts a new series of existence in the form of the particles of the jug, then also there are many other illustrations (e.g. the blowing out of a flame) in which the explanation of the starting of a new series is not available. If it is argued that negation is mere nothing and as such does not depend on a cause like chimerical entities, e.g. the lotus of the sky, such an explanation would be meaningless; for negations or destructions are conditioned in time just as are any positive entities, and as such are different from chimerical entities (pratiyogivad eva niyata-kālatayā pramitasya atyanta-tucchatā-yogāt). If negations be regarded as similar to chimerical entities, then the former would be as beginningless as the latter, and, if this were so, then there would be no positive entities, all being beginningless negations. If negation were chimerical, then even at the time of negation there could be the positive entities, for negation being chimerical could not condition anything and this would amount to the persistence of all entities and cannot be acceptable to momentarists like the Buddhists. If negations were devoid only of certain specific characters, then they would be like the unique-charactered entities (svalakṣaṇa) which are also devoid of certain specific characters. If they were devoid of all characters (sarva-svabhāva-viraha), then they could have no place in a proposition which must affirm some predicate of them. If it is said that negation has a character as such, then that being its character it would not be devoid of any character. If such negations were not pre-existent, then their coming into being must depend on some