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262 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [ch. (c) Refutation of the Atomic Theory of Nyāya in
relation to Whole and Part. In refuting the Nyāya view that the parts attach themselves to each other and thereby produce the whole, and ultimately the partless atoms combine together to form a molecule, Venkața introduces the following arguments. So far as the association of the wholes through their parts (beginning from the molecules) through the association of the parts are concerned, Verkața has nothing to object. His objection is against the possibility of an atomic contract for the formation of molecules. If the atoms combine together through their parts, then these parts may be conceived to have further parts, and thus there would be infinite regress. If these parts are regarded as not different from the whole, then the different atoms could well be regarded as occupying the same atomic space, and thus they would not produce a conglomeration bigger in size than the constituent atoms. Further, it is not possible to imagine that there should be wholes without the parts also being present. Proceeding in this way, if the atomic combination cannot account for the origin of bigger measures, the possibility of objects of different magnitude through conglomeration (e.g. a hill or a mustard seed) would be inexplicable. If it is said that parts refer to the different sides of an atom, then also it might be urged that a partless atom cannot have sides.
It is held that knowledge, though one, can refer to many, though it is partless. It may also be urged in this connection that if it refers to all objects in their entirety, then the constituent entities would not be referred to separately, and it cannot also refer to the objects separately in parts, for then intelligence itself would not be partless. The Naiyāyika may also, on this analogy, urge that any solution that the idealist may find to his difficulty also applies to the atomic theory. To this the obvious answer of the idealist is that in the case of intelligence, experience testifies that though one and partless it can refer to many, and the Naiyāyikas have no such advantage to show in their favour, for the Naiyāyikas do not admit that in any case wholes may combine except through their parts. The objection cannot be laid against the Buddhist theory of conglomeration (sanghāta), for there such conglomeration is not due to contact. The Naiyāyikas may be supposed to raise an objection regarding the association of all-pervasive entities (vibhu) with finite
