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xx] Epistemology according to Meghanādāri and others 245 one notion (e.g. the silver) appears as qualifying the other notion (the "this” before the eye). Moreover, if two independent notions which are not related as substance and quality be miscomprehended as one concept, then any notion could be so united with any other notion, because the memory-images which are stored in our past experiences are limitless. Again the silver that was experienced in the past was experienced in association with the space in which it existed, and the reproduction of the silver and memory would also be associated with that special spatial quality. This would render its mis-association with the percept before the perceiver impossible on account of the spatial difference of the two. If it is contended that through the influence of defects the spatial quality of the memory-image is changed, then that would be the anyathā-khyāti theory, which would be inadmissible in the akhyāti view. Again since all sensible qualities must be associated with some kind of spatial relation, even if the original spatial quality be transmuted or changed, that would be no reason why such a spatial image should be felt as being in front of the perceiver. It must also be said that the distinctive differences between the memory-image and the percept are bound to be noted; for if such a distinctive difference were not noted, the memory-image could not be distinguished as "silver-image.” It cannot also be said that though the percept can be distinguished from the memory-image the latter cannot be distinguished from the former, for the discriminative character is a constituent of both, and it is nothing but the white shining attribute. If it is urged that the spatial and other distinctive qualities are not noted in the memory-iinage and it appears merely as an image, then it may well be objected that any and every memory-image may be confused with the present percept, and even a stone may appear as silver.
Since both the a-nirvacaniya-khyāti and the akhyāti are in some sense yathārtha-khyāti, Meghanādāri refuted these two theories of illusion and attempted to show that the yathārtha-khyāti would be untenable in these views. Now he tries to show that all other possible interpretations of yathārtha-khyāti are invalid. The fundamental assumption of yathārtha-khyāti is that all knowledge must correspond to a real object like all right knowledge!. Thus, in other
I vipratipannaḥ pratyayo yatha-rthah pratyatvāt, sampratipanna-pratyayavaditi. Naya-dyu-mani, p. 140 (MS.).
