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xx] Epistemology according to Meghanādāri and others 243
Again it is said that the illusory silver is called indefinable (anirvacanīya) because it is different from pure being such as the self which is never contradicted in experience (ātmano bādhā-yogāt) and from non-being such as the chimerical entities like the hare's horn which can never be objects of knowledge (khyāty-ayogāt). But in reply to this it may very well be urged that the being of the self cannot itself be proved, for if the self were the object of knowledge it would be as false as the world appearance; and if it were not it could not have any being. It cannot also be said to have being because of its association with the class concept of being, for the self is admitted to be one, and as such cannot be associated with class conceptt. Again want of variability cannot be regarded as a condition of reality, for if the cognitive objects are unreal because they are variable, the knower himself would be variable on account of his association with variable objects and variable relations, and would therefore be false. Again being (sattā) is not as universal as it is supposed to be, for it is different from the entities (jug, etc.) to which it is supposed to belong and also from negation in the view that holds negation to be a positive category?. If the self is regarded as self-luminous, then it may also be contended that such self-luminosity must be validly proved; and it may also be urged that unless the existence of the self has already been so proved its character cannot be proved to be self-luminous.3
Again the akhyāti view is liable to two different interpretations, in both of which it may be styled in some sense as yathārtha-khyāti. In the first interpretation the illusion is supposed to be produced in the following manner: the visual organ is affected by the shining character of something before the eyes, and this shining character, being of the same nature as that of the silver, the shining character of the silver is remembered, and since it is not possible to dis
tasya drsyatrā-nabhyupagame sasa-visāņā-di-sāmyam. ātmanaḥ prameyata ca ne ste'ti, na tatas tat-sattā-siddhiḥ. tad-abhyupagatau ca prapancavanmithyātvam... ātma-vyakter ekatva-bhimānāt tad-vyatirikta-padārthasyā'sattva-bhimanacca sattā-samavāyitvā-nupapatteh. Meghanādāri, Naya-dyu-maņi.
* atha ghata-pață-di-bhedānām vyāvartamānatvenā pāramarthyam... ātmano'pi ghata-pațādi-sarva-padārthebhyo vyāvartamānatvān mithyātva-pattih...abhivyanjaka-parumärthye'bhivyañgya-pāramārthyam...na ca sattvasyai'va samasta-padurtheşv anuvartamānam pāramārthyam. ghațădayo'pi tad-apekṣayā vyāvartante... abhāvasya padārthă-ntarbhāve'pi tatra satta-nabhyupagamāt sarva-padārtha-nuurtty-abhāvät. Ibid.
s na ca tasya svayam-prakāśatvan na pramāņā-pekşe'ti svayam-prakāśatvasya'pi pramāņā-dhinatvāt pramāņā-ntara-siddhā-tmanah svayam-prakāśatvasya sādhyatvācca. na hi dharmy-aprasidhau dharma-sādhyatā. Ibid.
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