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238 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH.
In refuting the ātma-khyāti theory of illusion of the Buddhists, Venkata says that if the idealistic Buddhist can admit the validity of the different awarenesses as imposed on the one fundamental consciousness, then on the same analogy the validity of the perceived objects may also be admitted. If the different subjective and objective awarenesses are not admitted, then all experiences would be reduced to one undifferentiated consciousness, and that would be clearly against the Buddhistic theory of knowledge. The Buddhist view that entities which are simultaneously apprehended are one, and that therefore knowledge and its objects which are apprehended simultaneously are one, is wrong. Knowledge and its objects are directly apprehended as different, and therefore the affirmation of their identity is contradicted in experience. The Mādhyamika Buddhists further hold that, just as in spite of the falsehood of the defects (doşn), illusions happen, so in spite of the falsehood of any substratum or any abiding entity, illusions may appear as mere appearances without any reality behind them. Against such a view, Venkata says that whatever is understood by people as existent or non-existent has always a reference to a reality, and mere phenomena without any basis or ground on reality are incomprehensible in all our experience. Hence the pure phenomenalism of the Wādhyamika is wholly against allexperience. When people speak of non-existence of any entity, they always do it with some kind of spatial or temporal qualification. Thus, when they say that the book does not exist, they always qualify this nonexistence with a "here" and a "there" or with a "now" ora" then." But pure unqualified non-existence is unknown to ordinary experience? Again all positive experience of things is spatially limited (c.g. there is a jug “here'); if this spatial qualification as "here" is admitted, then it cannot be held that appearances occur on mere nothing (nir-adhisthāna-bhramā-nupapattih). If, however, the limitation of a "here" or "there” is denied, then no experience is possible (pratiter apahnava eva syāt).
Criticizing the a-nirvacanīva theory of illusion of the Vedāntists Venkațanātha says that when the Sankarites described all things as
loke bhāra-bhava-sabdayos tat-pratityos ca vidyumānasyai'ra rastunuh avasthū-višeşa-gocarattasya pratipăditatrāt. prakarā-ntarasya ca loka-siddhapramāņā-vişayatvád ity-arthah. Vyuya-sära, p. 46.
2 sarvo'pi nisedhah sa-pratiyogiko niyata-desa-kalasca pratiyate. Nirupadhir niyata-deśa-küla-pratiyogi-riseșaņa-rahito niședho na pralivate iti. Ibid. p. 46.
dhirni topi nişedrichs-anthan. panding
