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xx] Epistemology according to Meghanādāri and others 239 indefinable (a-nirvacanīya), the word “indefinable" must mean either some definite trait, in which case it would cease to be indefinable, or it might mean failure to define in a particular manner, in which case the Sankarites might as well accept the Rāmānuja account of the nature of the universe. Again when the Sankarites are prepared to accept such a self-contradictory category as that which is different both from being and non-being (sad-asadvyatirekaḥ), why cannot they rather accept things as both existent and non-existent as they are felt in experience? The self-contradiction would be the same in either case. If, however, their description of the world-appearance as something different from being and non-being is for the purpose of establishing the fact that the worldappearance is different both from chimerical entities (tuccha) and from Brahman, then Rāmānujists should have no dispute with them. Further, the falsity of the world does not of itself appeal to experience; if an attempt is made to establish such a falsity through unfounded dialectic, then by an extension of such a dialectic even Brahman could be proved to be self-contradictory. Again the assertion that the world-appearance is non-existent because it is destructible is unfounded; for the Upanişads speak of Brahman, the individual souls and the prakrti as being eternal. The Sankarites also confuse destruction and contradiction (nacai kyam nāśa-bādhayoḥ)'.
The followers of Patañjali speak of an illusory comprehension through linguistic usage in which we are supposed to apprehend entities which have no existence. This is called nirvisaya-khyāti. Thus, when we speak of the head of Rāhu, we conceive Rāhu as having an existence apart from his head, and this apprehension is due to linguistic usage following the genitive case-ending in Rāhu, but Venkața urges that it is unnecessary to accept a separate theory of illusion for explaining such experience, since it may well be done by the akhyāti or anyathā-khyāti theory of illusion, and he contends that he has already demonstrated the impossibility of other theories of illusion.
Meghanādāri, however, defines pramāna as the knowledge that determines the objects without depending on other sources of knowledge such as memory?
1 Nyāya-parisuddhi, pp. 48-51.
• "tatrā'nya-pramāņā-napekşam artha-paricchedakam jñanam pramānam, artha-paricchede'nya-pramăna-sāpekşa-smrtāv ativyāpti-parihare'nya-pramānānapekşam iti.” Naya-dyu-mani, Madras Govt. Oriental MS.
