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xx] Error and Doubt according to Verkațanātha 217 vivid impression (pramāyā āparoksyam nāma višadā-vabhāsatvam). Clearness and vividness with him mean the illumination of the special and unique features of the object, as different from the appearance of generic features as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge.
Meghanādāri also defines perception as direct knowledge of objects (artha-paricchedaka-sāksāj-jñānam). The directness (sāksattva) consists in the fact that the production of this knowledge does not depend on any other pramānas. It is, no doubt, true that senseperception depends upon the functioning of the senses, but this is no objection; for the senses are common causes, which are operative as means in the perception of the hetu, even in inference. The directness of perceptual knowledge, as distinguished from inference, is evident from the fact that the latter is produced through the mediacy of other cognitions?. Veghanādāri criticizes the definition of perception as vivid impression (visadā-vabhāsa), as given by Varadavisnu Miśra, on the ground that vividness is a relative term, and even in inference there are different stages of vividness. Clearness of awareness, “dhi-sphuţatā,” also cannot be regarded as defining perception; for all awarenesses are clear so far as they are known. The definition of perception as sense-knowledge is also open to criticism; for in that case it would only apply to indeterminate (nirvikalpa) knowledge, in which certain specific characters of the object are imprinted through the functioning of the senses, but which it did not carry further for the production of determinate knowledge (savikalpa).
Both Venkațanātha and Meghanādāri hold that the pure objective substance without any character or universals is never apprehended by sense-perception. Following Rāmānuja, they hold that objects are always apprehended with certain characters at the very first instance when they are grasped by the visual sense; otherwise it is difficult to explain how in the later instance they are apprehended in diverse characters. If they were not apprehended in the first instance, they could not have been known in the later
1 indriyāņām satta-kāranatvena karanatvā-bhāvāt. Naya-dyu-mani.
2 The word sākṣāttva is explained by some as svarūpa-dhi (its own awareness). But such an explanation is exposed to criticism; for even inferential knowledge reveals some features of the object. If svarūpa is taken to mean "nothing but the nature of the object," then the definition would not be applicable even to perception; for perception reveals not merely the object, but also its relation to other objects, and thereby transcends the limit of the object merely as it is.
