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232 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought (CH. a hare's horn, which is absent in all known spheres, must necessarily belong to an unperceived entity which is obviously false.
It may be contended that, if the vyatireki inference is not admitted, then that amounts to a denial of all defining characters; for a defining character is that which is absent everywhere except in the object under definition, and thus definition is the very nature of vyatireki inference. The obvious reply to this is that definition proceeds from the perception of special characteristics which are enunciated as the defining characteristics of a particular object, and it has therefore nothing to do with vyatireki inferencel. It may also be urged that defining characteristics may also be gathered by joint method of agreement and difference, and not by a ryatireki inference as suggested by the opponents. In such an instance as where knowability is defined as that which is capable of being known, no negative instances are known but it still remains a definition. The definition of definition is that the special characteristic is existent only in the object under definition and nowhere else (a-sādhāraṇa-ty'āpako dharmo laksanam). In the case where a class of objects is defined the defining class-character would be that which should exist in all individuals of that class, and should be absent in all other individuals of other classes. But when an individual which stands alone (such as God) is defined, then we have no class-character, but only unique character which belongs to that individual only and not to a class. Even in such cases, such a defining character differentiates that entity from other entities (Brahmā, Siva, etc.) with which, through partial similarity, He might be confused. Thus, the definition is a case of agreement of a character in an entity, and not a negation, as contended by those who confuse it with ayatireki inference. Therefore, the keralavyatireki form of inference cannot be supported by any argument.
On the subject of propositions (avayava) Venkațanātha holds that there is no reason why there should be five propositions for all inference. The dispute, therefore, among various logicians regarding the number of propositions that can be admitted in an inference is meaningless; for just so many propositions need be admitted for an inference as are sufficient to make the inference appeal to the
arthā-sādhāraņā-kāra-pratipatti-nibandhanam sajātīya-vijātīya-t'yavacchedena lakṣunam.
Tattva-ratnākara, quoted in Nyāya-parisuddhi, p. 143. 2 Nyāya-parisuddhi, p. 145.
