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Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH.
of inference is that the hetu or reason must exist in the sa-paksa (that is, in all such instances where there is the sādhya), but in the vyatireki form of inference, where there are no positive instances of the existence of the hetu and the sadhya excepting the point at issue, the above condition necessarily fails1. The opponent might say that on the same analogy the kevalā-nvayi form of argument may also be denied; for there negative instances are found (e.g. idam vācyam prameyatvāt). The reply would be that the validity of a kevalā-nvayi form of argument is attested by the fact that the assumption of a contrary conclusion would be self-contradictory. If the contention of the opponent is that the universal concomitance of the negation of the hetu with the negation of the sadhya implies the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sadhya, then the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sadhya would imply the absolute coincidence of the opposites of them both. This would imply that from the absolute coincidence of the hetu and the sadhya in a kevalā-nvayi form of inference the absolute coincidence of their opposites would be demonstrable. This is absurd". Thus, the Naiyaikas, who admit. the kevală-nvayi inference, cannot indulge in such ways of support in establishing the validity of the kevala-vyatireki form of argument. Again, following the same method, one might as well argue that a jug is self-revealing (sva-prakāśa) because it is a jug (ghatatvāt); for the negation of self-revealing character (a-sva-prakāśatva) is found in the negation of jug, viz. the cloth, which is impossible (yan naivam tan naivam vathā paṭah). Thus, merely from the concomitance of two negations it is not possible to affirm the concomitance of their opposites. Again, in the above instanceanubhutir ananubhāvyā anubhūtitvāt (immediate intuition cannot be an object of awareness, because it is immediate intuition)—even the existence of an-anubhavyatva (not being an object of awareness) is doubtful; for it is not known to exist anywhere else than in the instance under discussion, and therefore, from the mere case of
1 The typical forms of ryatireki inference are as follows: anubhutir ananubhāvyā anubhūtitvāt, yan naivam tan naivam yatha ghatah. prthivt itarebhyo bhidvate gandhavattṛāt yan naivam tan naivam yathā jalam. In the above instance an-anubhavyatra (non-cognizability) belongs only to immediate intuition. There is thus no sa-paksa of anubhuti where an-anubhāvyatva was found before.
2 idam vācyam prameyatvat (this is definable, because it is knowable) would, under the supposition, imply that the concomitance of the negation of racyatva and prameyatva, viz. avācyatva (indefinable) and aprameyatva (unknowable), would be demonstrable; which is absurd, since no such cases are known.
