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228 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [ch. tion, and on that analogy even perception may be called mental intuition.
Vyāpti (concomitance) may be defined as that in which the area of the probandum (sādhya) is not spatially or temporally less than (a-nyūna-deśa-kāla-vrtti) that of the reason, hetu—and reason is defined as that, the area of which is never wider than that of the probandum (a-nadhik-deśa-kala-niyatam vyāpyam). As an illustration of spatial and temporal co-existence (yaugapadya) Venkațanātha gives the instance of sugar and sweetness. As an illustration of temporal co-existence (yaugapadya) he gives the example of the measure of the shadow and the position of the sun. As a case of purely spatial co-existence he gives the instance of heat and its effects. Sometimes, however, there is concomitance between entities which are separate in space and time, as in the case of tides and their relation to the sun and the moon?
Such a concomitance, however, between the probandum and the reason can be grasped only by the observation of numerous instances (bhūyo-darśana-gamya), and not by a single instance, as in the case of Sankara Vedānta as expounded by Dharmārājādhvarīndra. Bhattārakaguru, in his Tattva-ratnākara, in explaining the process by which the notion of concomitance is arrived at, says that, when in numerous instances the concomitance between the probandum and the reason is observed, the result of such observation accumulates as subconscious impressions in favour of the universal concomitance between all cases of probandum and all cases of the reason, and then in the last instance the perception of the concomitance rouses in the mind the notion of the concomitance of all probandum and all reason through the help of the roused subconscious impressions previously formed. Venkațanātha admits concomitance through joint method of Agreement and Difference (anvyaya-vyatireki) and by pure Agreement (kevalā-nvayi), where negative instances are not available. Ordinarily the method of difference contributes to the notion of concomitance by demonstrating that each and every instance in which the probandum does not occur is also an instance in which the reason does not occur. But in the case of kevalā-nvayi concomitance, in which negative instances
qoyāpti is thus defined by Venkațanātha---atre'dam tattvam yādrg-rūpasya yad-deśa-kala-vartino yasya yādrg-rūpena yad-deśa-kāla-vartinā yenā'vinā-bhāraḥ tad idam arina-bhūtam vyāpyum. tat-pratisambandhi-vyāpakam iti. Nyāyaparisuddhi, pp. 101-102.
