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226 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought (ch. comitance. The example given for spatial and temporal co-existence is that between date-juice (rasa) and sweetness (guda), or between the shadow thrown by our bodies and the specific position of the Sun. But such spatio-temporal co-existences do not exhaust all cases, as, for example, the sunset and the surging of the sea. This led the later Rāmānujas to adopt a stricter definition of concomitance as unconditional and invariable association (nirupadhikatayā niyataḥ sambandho ryāptih).
Regarding the formation of this inductive generalization or concomitance, we find in Tattva-ratnākara, an older authority, that a single observation of concomitance leading to a belief is sufficient to establish a general proposition? But Venkațanātha urges that this cannot be so and that a wide experience of concomitance is indispensable for the affirmation of a general proposition of concomitance.
One of the important points in which Rāmānuja logic differs from the Nyāya logic is the refusal on the part of the former to accept kevala-vyatireki (impossible-positive) forms of inference, which are admitted by the latter. Thus, in the kevala-ryatireki forms of inference (e.g. earth is different from other elements on account of its possession of smell) it is argued by the Nyāya logic that this difference of earth with other elements, by virtue of its possession of the specific property of smell not possessed by any other element, cannot be proved by a reference to any proposition which embodies the principle of agreement in presence anraya. This view apparently seems to have got the support of the earlier Rāmānuja logicians such as Varadavisnu Miśra and Bhattārakaguru (in his Tattva-ratnākara); but both Verkațanātha (in his Nyāya-pariśuddhi) and the author of the Rāmānuja-siddhānta-samgraha point
· Nyāya-parisuddhi.
sambandho'yam sakrd grāhyaḥ pratiti-sva-rasāt tathā pratītayo hi sva-rasād dharma-dharmy-avadhin viduh.
Tattva-ratnākara MS. The author of the Tattva-ratnākara urges that, since the class-concept (e.g. of dhūma-dhūmatva) is associated with any particular instance (e.g. of smoke), the experience of any concomitance of smoke and fire would mean the comprehension of the concomitance of the class-concept of smoke with the class-concept of fire. So through the experience of any individual and its class-concept as associated with it we are in touch with other individuals included within that class-concept
-sannihita-dhūmādi-vyakti-samyuktasya indriyasya tad-āśrita-dhūmattādih samyuktā-sritah, tad-āśrayatvena vyakty-antarāni samyuktāni, etc. Nyāyaparisuddhi, p. 105. (Chowkhamba.)
