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152
The Philosophy of Yamunācārya
[CH.
or consciousness is never produced in it, but when the obstructions are removed and the self comes into touch with the objects, the consciousness of these objects shines forth.
God and the World.
As we have already noted, the Mīmāmsists do not admit the existence of Isvara. Their antitheistic arguments, which we have not considered, can be dealt with here in contrast to Yamuna's doctrine of Isvara. They say that an omniscient Isvara cannot be admitted, since such an assumption cannot be proved, and there are, indeed, many objections to the hypothesis. For how can such a perception of omniscience be acquired? Surely it cannot be acquired by the ordinary means of perception; for ordinary perception cannot give one the knowledge of all things present and past, before and far beyond the limits of one's senses. Also the perception of Isvara generally ascribed to the Yogins cannot be admitted; for it is impossible that the Yogin should perceive past things and things beyond the limits of his senses, by means of his sense-organs. If mind (antaḥkarana) be such that it can perceive all sense-objects without the aid of the senses, then what is the use at all of the senses? Of course it is true that by great concentration one can perceive things more clearly and distinctly; but no amount of concentration or any other process can enable a man to hear by the eye or to perceive things without the help of the senses. Omniscience is therefore not possible, and we have not by our senses seen any such omniscient person as Iśvara. His existence cannot be proved by inference; for, since He is beyond all perceptible things, there cannot be any reason (hetu) which we could perceive as being associated with Him and by reason of which we could make Him the subject of inference. It is urged by the Naiyāyikas that this world, formed by collocation of parts, must be an effect in itself, and it is argued that, like all other effects, this also must have taken place under the superintendence of an intelligent person who had a direct experience of world materials. But this is not necessary; for it may very well be conceived that the atoms, etc., have all been collocated in their present form by the destinies of men (adrṣṭa)-- according to the karma, of all the men in the world. The karmas of merit and demerit exist in us all, and they are moulding the world
