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210 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [cu. one memory joining up the two alternative entities (e.g. tree-stump and man), and a majority party, who think that the perception of something in front of us leads directly to the memory of two different alternatives, which is interpreted as doubt. The former view, by linking up the two memories in one act of knowledge, supposes the oscillating movement to be one act of judgment and so holds the opinion that in doubt also there is the false substitution of one judgment for another, which is in accordance with the anyathā-khyāti (illegitimate substitution of judgments) theory of illusion. The latter view, which holds that there are two separate memories of the two possible alternatives, interprets Rāmänuja as an upholder of realism of knowledge (jñana-rathārthya-rūda), or the view that whatever is known or perceived has an objective and a real basis.
Error and Doubt according to Venkatanātha.
Error is defined by Venkatanātha as occurring when one or more incompatible characters are predicted of an entity without any notion of their incompatibility or contradictions. It is generally due to a wrong psychological tendency in association with other vicious perceptual data, as in the case of the perception of the conch-shell as yellow, the perception of one big moon as small and two, the relativistic (anekānta) assertion of contradictory predicaies with reference to one thing or the predication of both reality and unreality in regard to world-appearance by the Sankarites!. Doubt, on the other hand, occurs when a perceived characteristic is not incompatible in predication with regard to two or more entities which are felt to be exclusive and opposed to one another, and which therefore cannot both at the same time be affirmed. This state is therefore described by some as an oscillatory movement of the mind from one pole to another. Decision results from a unipolar and firm direction of mind to one object; doubt results from a multipolar oscillation, as has been set forth in the Atma-siddhi. Absence of firmness of the direction of the mind is due to the natural constitution of mind, which has necessarily to reject a particular alternative before it can settle down in its opposite. Bhattārakaguru repeats the same idea in his Tattva-ratnākara, when he defines
See Nyāyu-parisuddhi, pp. 54-5.
