________________
202 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [ch. the best-reputed philosopher of the Rāmānuja school, seeks to determine the necessity of the admission of validity (prāmānya) or invalidity (a-prāmānya) as naturally belonging to certain proportions or facts, as a preliminary to our quest of truth or objective and knowable facts. If the distinction of valid and invalid propositions is not admitted, then neither can any thesis be established, nor can practical affairs run on. But, though in this way the distinction between valid and invalid propositions has to be admitted on the basis of its general acceptance by people at large, yet their real nature has still to be examined. Those who deny such a distinction can have four alternative views, viz. that all propositions are valid, that all propositions are invalid, that all propositions mutually contradict one another, or that all propositions are doubtful. If all propositions are valid, then the negation of such a proposition is also valid, which is self-contradictory; if they are all invalid, then even such a proposition is invalid and hence no invalidity can be asserted. As to the third alternative, it may be pointed out that invalid propositions can never contradict the valid ones. If one valid proposition restricts the sphere of another valid proposition, this does not mean contradiction. A valid proposition has not to depend on other propositions for making its validity realized; for a valid proposition guarantees its own validity. Lastly, if you doubt everything, at least you do not doubt that you doubt; so then you are not consistent in saying that you doubt everything; for at least in one point you are certain, viz. that you doubt everything? Thus it has to be admitted that there are two classes of propositions, valid and invalid. But, though the general distinction between valid and invalid propositions be admitted, yet proper inquiry, investigation, or examination, is justified in attempting to determine whether any particular proposition is valid or invalid. That only is called a pramāna which leads to valid knowledge.2 In the case of perception, for example, those which would lead to valid knowledge would be defectless eyes, mind-contact as attention, proper proximity of the object, etc., and these would jointly constitute pramāna. But in the
1 This remark naturally reminds one of Descartes-sarvam sandigdham iti te nipunasyāsti niscayah, samsayaś ca na sandigdhaḥ sandigdhādraita-vādinah. Nyāya-parisuddhi. p. 34. Chowkhamba s.s.
2 A distinction is here made between karana-prāmānya and aśraya-pramanya (pramāśrayasya īśvarasya prāmānyam angikytam). Nyāya-sāra commentary on Nyāya-parisuddhi by Sriniväsa, p. 35.
